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ABSTRACT 
 The Russian Federation‘s reliance on nuclear weapons for national security will 
steadily increase over time. Based on current evidence and historical data, the Russian 
state will be unable to recruit, arm, train, equip, reform, and fund their conventional 
forces well enough to match up with capabilities of what it views to be its potential 
adversaries. Russia‘s historic experience with invasion and vulnerable geographic 
position reinforce the need for a powerful weapon with which to maintain the current 
regime and ensure its territorial integrity. Declining demographics and persistent social 
illnesses will reduce the number of eligible male candidates able to serve in the military. 
Also, Russia‘s leaders perceive a threat environment in which there are persistent threats 
to the existence of the Russian Federation. Finally, nuclear weapons provide a relatively 
cheap and effective weapon that possesses massive destructive capability, is easily 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The Russian Army is never as strong as it describes itself but never as weak as it 
seems from the outside. 
-Old Russian adage, cited in Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko,  
Russia’s Restless Frontier 
 
The main foundation of national security in Russia remains, and will remain for a 
long time to come, nuclear deterrence forces. 
-President Vladimir Putin, October 2, 2003 
 
 In 2005, then-President Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as ―the 
greatest geopolitical catastrophe‖ of the 20th century.
1
 At least from the Russian 
perspective, he was, and still is, correct. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to 
substantial political, economic, and social upheavals. Russia lost control over huge 
swaths of territory, some of which it had controlled for centuries. Ethnic Russians living 
in the newly independent states suddenly found themselves in the minority. The failures 
by the new political leadership under Boris Yeltsin only exacerbated the consequences of 
the collapse making the 1990s a chaotic period in Russian history. 
 The Russian military suffered heavily during the post-Soviet era of the 1990s. It 
saw massive budget cuts and downsizing. Yeltsin perceived the military as a political 
threat to his position and did his best to reduce and mitigate the strengths of the military. 
The economic crisis that followed the collapse necessitated deep budget cuts. Cuts in 
military budgets, manpower, and political influence, all of which had been substantial 
                                                 
1
―Putin Deplores Collapse of the USSR,‖ BBC News, April 25, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm.  
2 
during the Soviet era, severely diminished Russia‘s conventional military forces. The loss 
of funding impacted current military construction projects, salaries, benefits, and living 
conditions for Russia soldiers. These cuts, compounded by the large losses in territory 
with the breakup of the Soviet Union and United States‘ demonstrated technological edge 
during the first Gulf War, also greatly hurt morale amongst the Russian Armed Forces. 
 Today, the Russian Federation has regained its balance. Conditions in Russia have 
substantially improved since 2000 with the Presidency of Vladimir Putin and the 
continuation of his policies under the current President, Dimitri Medvedev. However, the 
Russian military still lags behind in modernization and capability. Some experts estimate 
that currently Russia is as much as 20-30 years behind the West in many areas of 
technical progress.
2
 The conventional military forces of the Russian Federation have yet 
to recover and overcome their demonstrated inefficiencies and weaknesses. Until that 
time, Russia‘s leaders feel that their country is vulnerable to outside attack, even though 
there does not appear to be any imminent outside threat. This has forced a reliance on 
nuclear weapons – both strategic and tactical – by Russia‘s leaders as a ―stop gap‖ 
measure until reform and modernization of conventional forces allow them to take on the 
role of deterring attacks and defending the Russian Federation. However, Russia‘s 
reliance on nuclear weapons may turn out to be more than a temporary solution to its 
national security needs. 
 The Russian Federation will be forced to make nuclear weapons the primary 
means of ensuring its national security. At this time, the Russian government faces 
numerous foreign and domestic obstacles that will make it unable to depend on its 
                                                 
2
 ―Russia to Start Licensed Production of Foreign Military Equipment,‖ RIA Novosti, May 21, 2010, 
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100521/159099501.html. 
3 
conventional forces to ensure Russia‘s national security. Compounded, these obstacles 
will increase Russian reliance of its nuclear forces because nuclear weapons will provide 
the only assured guaranteed means of successfully deterring or defeating an external 
threat. First, the sheer size of territory that the Russian military is responsible for 
defending makes nuclear weapons necessary to ensure its territorial integrity. Second, the 
perception by Russia‘s leaders, elites, and general population that Russia is surrounded 
by threats will demand strong nuclear forces. Third, unfavorable social issues such as 
falling birthrates and an increase in alcoholism, drug use, and disease amongst the 
Russian population will severely limit the number of eligible candidates for military 
service. Fourth, Russia‘s conventional forces – air, sea and land – are currently unable to 
ensure the defense of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons hold a 
number of clear advantages over conventional forces in terms of cost, maintenance, and 
effectiveness in military conflict. However, crossing the nuclear threshold is still 
considered to be a last and desperate measure. Fifth, based on current evidence, Russia‘s 
military industry will not be able to provide conventional military equipment equivalent 
to what is currently being produced or purchased by other states. Finally, nuclear 
weapons represent Russia‘s best chance of countering the deployment of any ballistic 
missile system. This paper will explore the issues that will turn Russia‘s reliance on 






CHAPTER TWO: GEOGRAPHY 
 
 Understanding Russia‘s geography is critical to understanding why the Russia 
Federation is, and will continue to be, reliant on nuclear weapons for defense. Even if 
Russian conventional forces were substantially better trained, equipped, and manned, 
they would still have difficulty in protecting Russian territory against a foreign aggressor 
in a major military conflict. Russia is too big and spread out for military forces to be 
strong enough everywhere, and concentrating in one area leaves other regions exposed 
and vulnerable. While Russian military districts have been reorganized to mitigate this 
weakness, it still leaves thousands of kilometers of border to defend and monitor. Nuclear 
weapons offer Russia‘s leader the best means by which to both deter an attack and win a 
future conflict with an aggressor intent on attacking the Russian state on any front of the 
entire Federation. 
Russia‘s geography has long been both a blessing and a curse. A curse because it 
fails to provide any significant defensive features and a blessing because the sheer size of 
Russia makes it more than any foreign invader can hope to secure. Historically, the 
leaders of Russia have consistently pushed outward in the hopes of securing territory and 
geographic features that can act as defensive obstacles such as the Pripet Marshes and the 
Caucasus and Carpathian Mountains. These features either allow for locations where 
Russian military forces can be concentrated with natural defenses or allow its forces to be 
diverted to routes more likely to be used by invaders. A byproduct of this expansion was 
5 
the acquisition of more territory that a potential adversary would have to conquer, and 
secure, before reaching the political and economic centers of the Russian empire. The 
size of the empire also provided Russian forces with plenty of strategic depth in which to 
retreat in while any invader had to cross more and more territory which he had to secure 
for ever increasing supply lines. 
The Carpathian and the Caucasus mountain ranges are two of the defensive 
features that Russian leaders have long strived to control, either directly or through 
friendly regimes. Without control of these two mountain ranges, the interior of Russia is 
vulnerable to attack. Steppes and plains lie to the north of the Caucasus and to the north 
and east of the Carpathians in what is known as the European Plain. In the east, between 
the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea lie more steppes (See Figure 1). This terrain 
allowed for easy access to foreign invaders to attack the interior of the Russian empire. 
Both Napoleon and Nazi Germany invaded Russia by means of the Northern Plains, 




This constant vulnerability and history of invasion guides Russian geopolitics to 
this day. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost control of the territory south 
of the Caucasus Mountains to the three newly independent states of Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan. The loss of this buffer explains why Russia has been unwilling to 
compromise and let go of Chechnya or any other republic along the Caucasus range: the 
loss of them would deny Russia the natural defensive feature offered by these mountains 
and leave a vulnerable gap in Russia‘s defensive line along its southern flank. Letting one 
                                                 
3






―The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, October 
15, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081014_geopolitics_russia_permanent_struggle. 
 
or more of the republics go could trigger a chain reaction of independence movements 
that could drive Russia out of the isthmus between the Black and the Caspian Seas 
cutting off access to these bodies of water entirely. The loss of access to the Black Sea in 
particular would be devastating to Russian prestige and national security. Also, there are 
substantial fossil fuel deposits and pipelines in this region that Russia is unwilling to give 
up. 
The loss of control over Central Asia led to the emergence of five new republics. 
Losing control over these territories denied the Russia Federation access to large resource 
7 
deposits and a substantial portion of its strategic depth in the region. Also, while not 
ideal, Central Asia did provide some defensive geographic features such as the 
Himalayan Mountains in the south and east, and the Kara Kum Desert in Turkmenistan in 
the south. However, the loss of direct control over this region has not hurt Russia‘s 
national security as much as initially believed. Most of the governments in the region are 
still friendly towards Moscow and highly dependent on good relations with their former 
master. Other than China, which Russia borders elsewhere anyway, Russia does not 
currently face an adversary that could move through this region to attack from the south.  
 Today the Russian Federation encompasses over 6.5 million square miles, 
stretches over 10 time zones, possesses a 43,500 mile long border, and another 23,620 
miles of coast line.
4
 However, the Russian population hovers at just around 140 million.
5
 
Together this amounts to an overwhelming amount of territory to defend. Up until the 
end of World War II, Russia‘s ability to retreat, pursue a scorched earth policy, harass 
extended supply lines, and overwhelm any invader with its territory had served it well. 
However, the post-World War II era saw the advent of new weapons technologies such as 
nuclear weapons, missiles, and long-range bombers which have minimized Russia‘s 
geographic advantages. Since then, weapons have only become more sophisticated, 
powerful, and accurate. 
 These advancements in weapons technology have offset or reduced many of the 
advantages of Russia‘s geographic size. An adversary does not have to travel on foot or 
vehicle across the entire front to threaten or attack Moscow, St. Petersburg, or the other 
                                                 
4
 Milan V. Vego, ―Russia and the Return of Geopolitics,‖ Joint Forces Quarterly, 2007, 12. 
 
5
 ―The World Factbook 2011 (Russia),‖ The World Factbook 2011 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. 
8 
industrial and political centers of Russia. An adversary can now fly over defensive 
emplacements or launch a missile to strike at a target without ever having to place troops 
on the ground. Also, today, wars are more about achieving political objectives than 
territorial gains. The combination of political objectives and war without ground forces 
means that some of the advantages of Russia‘s geography are diminished. However, 
Russia‘s size still protects it from any attempts to seriously occupy it and allows it to 
disperse its military and industrial capabilities to make them less vulnerable. 
Nevertheless, the large amount of territory necessary to defend will overwhelm the 
current Russian military forces even if an attack only occurred along one front. With the 
majority of its forces concentrated against a single foe, it would leave other regions of the 
Russian state vulnerable to attack.  
In some circumstances, even getting its forces to the enemy would be difficult. 
―Russia‘s problem is that it is a vast country with relatively poor transportation.‖
6
 
Transporting Russian forces to a remote zone such as a conflict in the Russian Far East 
(RFE) or deep in Central Asia would take precious time and strain the logistical 
capabilities of the Russian military. The RFE is especially vulnerable as it would be easy 
for an adversary to cut the main infrastructure routes to the east, delaying a relief 
response by ground forces.  
If Russia were simultaneously attacked along its entire periphery, in spite of the 
size of its forces, it would be unable to easily protect itself. It would have 
difficulty mobilizing forces and deploying them to multiple fronts, so it would 
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The economic and financial burden of such a large military force would likely collapse 
the Russian state all over again.
8
 Depending on conventional forces limits the number of 
fronts the Russians can fight on and, as will be described later, may be unable to 
effectively counter an external threat.  
Despite this scenario, the probability of an attack on the Russian Federation on 
multiple fronts is unlikely to say the least but is a vulnerability that any state must 
consider, especially one such as Russia with so much exposed border. While possible, 
even Russia‘s leaders do not appear to consider the ―attack on all fronts‖ scenario all that 
likely. However, they consider the chance of an attack on at least one of their fronts very 
seriously as demonstrated by their military exercises. The exercises Zapad-99, Mobility 
2004, and Stability 2008 all simulated an attack on the Russian Federation by outside 






The Russian military has worked to improve its air mobility capabilities in an 
attempt to overcome its poor infrastructure east of the Urals. In June 2004, the Russian 
Armed Forces staged a military exercise codenamed ―Mobility 2004‖ which consisted of 
transporting Russian military personnel and equipment from the western military district 





 Nikolai Sokov, Russian Ministry of Defense’s New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle (James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 10, 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/reports/sok1003.htm. 
 
10
 Richard Weitz, ―Global Insights: Military Exercises Showcase Russian Power, and Its Limits,‖ World 






 While the exercise was successful, even with this air capability, these 
planes would be vulnerable to interdiction by enemy aircraft or mobile surface-to-air 
weapons requiring their own escorts for protection. Therefore, Russia Armed Forces still 
face major obstacles in deploying their forces to remote areas whereas nuclear weapons 
do not face such problems. 
Even with the advances in weapons technology, Russia‘s geographic size still 
gives it the ability to spread out and decentralize its military forces and military industry, 
and provide it plenty of places to hide facilities and stockpile weapons. The U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001and Iraq in 2003, demonstrated that instituting major political or 
military change still requires the commitment of ground troops even with the 
advancements in warfare. By comparison, the U.S. failed to achieve regime change in 
Iraq in 1991or in Libya (as of May 2011) despite vigorous air campaigns in both 
conflicts.  
Any commitment of ground forces by an adversary today against Russia would 
have the same consequences as in the past: large swaths of territory to secure, vulnerable 
supply lines, and plenty of territory within which to retreat. Ultimately, the pros and cons 
of Russia‘s territorial size will depend on the objectives of the adversary: is the purpose 
to defeat Russian military forces or force a change in government within Russia? 
Regardless of the attacker‘s objective, nuclear weapons provide an ideal answer to 
how Russia‘s leaders can hope to defend such a ―virtually indefensible‖ state with so 
much vulnerable coastline, porous borders, and limited number of military forces.
12
 First, 
                                                 
11
 Roger McDermott, ―Russia Launches Large-scale Military Exercise,‖ Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 36 
(June 21, 2004), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=29986. 
12
 Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 104. 
11 
Russia‘s nuclear forces are still very capable and can be delivered by each of the nuclear 
triad. Therefore, nuclear weapons will deter an adversary from believing that they can 
attack or capture Russian territory without consequence, even if they believe themselves 
capable of defeating Russia‘s conventional forces. Second, Russia's nuclear weapons can 
be delivered anywhere in the world in less than an hour by means of ICBMs or SLBMs. 
This means that whatever the status of Russia‘s conventional forces, Russia‘s leaders can 
still retaliate against an adversary without having to invade them. Finally, the devastating 
power of nuclear weapons far exceeds the destructive capability of conventional weapons 
making any attack on Russian territory extremely costly.  
The result is that the Russian leadership can successfully defend the full size of 
the Russian Federation and maintain its territorial integrity through the use – or threat – 
of nuclear weapons. Any adversary will have to take Russia‘s nuclear forces into 
consideration if it ever plans to take action against the Russia state, even if it possess 
limited goals and is not intent of threatening the survival of the Russian state. At this 
time, the only way that Russia‘s leaders will be able to defend their territory from a 
strong potential adversary, such as the United States, NATO, or China, is by maintaining 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent. However, as will be explained below, currently the 
Russia Federation does not face a serious outside threat, much less a threat of invasion by 






CHAPTER THREE: RUSSIA’S THREAT PERCEPTION 
 
 Russians have always had a strong sense of being under constant threat. One 
reason for this is due to the geographic vulnerability of Russia state referenced above. 
The other reason is because Russia has a long history of invasion. The Mongols, the 
French, the Swedes, the Poles, and the Germans have all attacked or invaded Russia, 
many of them on more than one occasion. Even during the Russian Civil War, the Whites 
received support from foreign nations in their battle against the Reds. After World War 
II, this feeling of vulnerability did not diminish as Soviet leaders saw the United States 
establish a ring of military bases around the world and fostered relationships with anti-
communist regimes around the Soviet Union in what became part of the U.S.‘s 
containment policy. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about internal 
instability, cuts to military budgets, losses of territory, bases, and production facilities, 
and many former satellite states rushed to be embraced by the West. 
 
The NATO Threat 
NATO, a military alliance specifically organized against the Soviet Union, was 
established to Russia‘s west and has endured for over 60 years. Since the Soviet Union‘s 
collapse this military bloc has expanded east and brought NATO troops and infrastructure 
closer to the Russian border and major urban centers. As part of NATO, new member 
states receive access to advanced military equipment and additional training to increase 
13 
their effectiveness and capabilities. This support is provided chiefly by the more powerful 
member states – Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States – which 
substantially improves the military capabilities of states along Russia‘s western border, 
many of whom are less than friendly towards Russia. The membership of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania are of particular concern as these were the first three former soviet states to 
join NATO and all three share a direct border with the Russian Federation.  
While expansion has slowed, the fact that at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest 
offers of extending membership to Ukraine and Georgia – two additional former soviet 
states that border Russia – was openly discussed has done little to alleviate the Russian 
fear that NATO poses a threat. Although the United States has since backed off under the 
Obama Administration, the Russian leadership no doubt viewed this action as the U.S.‘s 
and NATO‘s continued desire to expand the alliance closer to Russia.  
Also, the post-WWII U.S. relationships and alliances established with South 
Korea and Japan in Russia‘s Far East continue to endure to this day. Close U.S. relations 
with (at the time) the Shah of Iran, the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, and the governments 
of Israel, Pakistan and Turkey checked Soviet advances in the Middle East. Finally, even 
China emerged as a threat to the Soviet Union and almost led to full-fledged conflict. 
Although war was avoided, the Sino-Soviet split and China‘s eventual opening up to the 
United States did not improve Russian leaders‘ sense of security. 
 
Eastern Europe 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its subsequence breakup into numerous new 
states only made matters worse for Russia‘s political and military leaders as the borders 
14 
of Russia were pushed back in the west and the south. The loss of Belarus, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine dealt a heavy territorial blow as they lost a 
significant portion of their strategic depth on the Western front and a number of these 
states joined NATO and oriented themselves toward the West as much as possible.  
The loss of Ukraine was especially devastating due to the importance it plays as a 
transportation hub for the Russian Federation.  
Ukraine is the transit point for 80 percent of all natural gas shipped from Russia to 
Europe and is the connection point for most infrastructure – whether pipeline, 




Ukraine‘s independence also cost Russia direct access to the Russian naval base at 
Sevastopol in the Crimea. However, the recent election of pro-Russian President Viktor 
Yanukovich in 2010 and a vote by the Ukraine parliament to extend Russia‘s lease of the 
naval base by 25 years has secured Russian access to Sevastopol at least for the near 
future.
14
 Ukraine also possesses a large ethnic Russian population and significant 
industrial capability. Finally, from a cultural perspective, Ukraine is the birthplace of 
Russian culture and civilization, Kievan Rus‘, and its independence only emphasizes 
Russian weakness in the post-Cold War environment.  
 
The Caucasus States 
In the South along the Caucasus Mountains, the emergence of the newly 
independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan pushed the Russian border back 
                                                 
13




 ―Parliamentary Chaos as Ukraine Ratifies Fleet Deal,‖ BBC News, April 27, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8645847.stm.  
15 
to the very edge of the mountain range. In the past, this region acted as a territorial buffer 
against Turkish power.
15
 Today it acts as a ―Christian buffer between Islamic influences 
from the south and Russia‘s Muslim regions.‖
16
 The Caucasus Mountains represent one 
of the few natural geographic defensive features the Russian state held onto following the 
break of the USSR. This has made consolidating the states along the southern range of 
the Caucasus‘s under Russia influence – either through carrots or coercion – a top 
priority. 
The rugged terrain makes defense relatively easy. However, should the Russians 
lose their position the Caucasus altogether and be pushed north into the lowlands, 




The lowlands lead to the Russian steppe which facilitates a ground invasion of the Russia 
heartland.  
This is the reason the Russians are so unwilling to compromise on Chechnya. The 
southern part of Chechnya is deep in the Northern Caucasus. If that were lost, the 




The loss of the Caucuses states cut Russia off from the energy resources along the 
Azerbaijani coast of the Caspian Sea. This has been to Russia‘s detriment as a number of 
new energy pipelines have been constructed that traverse the Caucasus states and 
intentionally avoid crossing into Russia territory. The result is a reduction in Russian 
influence and control over energy resources being exported out of the Caspian Sea basin 
and Central Asia.  
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 Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 107. 
 
16
 ―Russia‘s Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities.‖ 
 
17






The Central Asia Republics (CAR), while independent, do not pose a major 
national security concern for Russia‘s leaders at this time. The five landlocked republics 
are tightly bound to Russian and ―rely heavily on transportation, communications, 
supply-chains, and other networks that either traverse Russia or fall under Moscow's 
control.‖
19
 However, regardless of these ties, Russia‘s leaders must take action to ensure 
these states stay in its orbit lest they seek closer ties with other nations or decide to 
pursue more independent policies.  To that end, ―Russian officials have also waged a 
low-keyed but effective campaign to limit American, Chinese, and other foreign 
economic competition in Central Asian countries.‖
20
 Of the five states, Kazakhstan is the 
most important due to its size, economic power, and the fact that it is the only one of the 
five that borders the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan is also very important because 
―[w]homever controls Kazakhstan would be a hundred miles from the Volga, a river 
highway for Russian agriculture‖ or a route for military invasion into the heartland of 
western Russia.
21
 Much like the Mississippi River in the United States, control over the 
Volga provides access to the interior of the Russian state. If Kazakhstan were to become 
hostile to Russia or allied with a potential adversary, such as China, it would force the 
Russian military to take action to ensure control of the Volga River or risk it falling into 
enemy hands.  
                                                 
19







 Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 109. 
17 
At this time Kazakhstan is likely to remain in Russia‘s orbit but China has been 
increasing ties with many of the CAR especially Kazakhstan. The two share a 1,500 km 
border and China has increased political and economic ties with all of the CAR.
22
 ―Trade 
between China and the five Central Asian countries totaled $25.9 billion in 2009, up from 
$527 million in 1992, according to Commerce Ministry statistics.‖
23
 Chinese consumer 
goods such as ―clothing, electronics and household appliances…have lately flooded 
Central Asia.‖
24
 China has also invested in the region to access its energy resources, 






Finally, Russia‘s relationship with China poses a major dilemma for its leaders. 
―Since the late 1980s, China and Russia have expanded their bilateral economic and 
security cooperation to unprecedented levels.‖
26
 While diplomatic relations have 
substantially improved since the Sino-Soviet split, Russia has yet to conclude whether 
China is a future threat or ally. Both states have followed similar authoritarian 
government paths and oppose U.S. unipolarity and unilateral action, however, China‘s 
                                                 
22
 ―The World Factbook 2011 (Kazakhstan),‖ The World Factbook 2011 (Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html. 
 
23
 Edward Wong, ―China Quietly Extends Footprints Into Central Asia,‖ New York Times (New York, 











 Weitz, ―Strategic Posture Review: Russia.‖ 
18 
growing economic power, military expansion, and growing demand for raw materials 
could threaten Russia‘s Far East or even lead to a conflict. 
Russian territory east of the Urals contains a population of only seven million 




roughly six hundred thousand illegal Chinese migrants a year are pouring 
northward into Russia‘s depopulated Far East – a number almost identical to 
Russia‘ annual population decline.…China‘s northeastern provinces alone have a 
total population of over one hundred million.…  
 
Russia‘s virgin Far East also contains massive deposits of zinc, nickel, tin, 
diamonds, and gold, as well as vast fisheries and timber forests – all of which are 




Russia‘s leaders find themselves in a difficult position as China has developed the region 
in a way that Russia cannot.
29
 Chinese investment in the region allows for extraction of 
natural resources and the development of infrastructure while also providing jobs for 
local residents and supplying cheap Chinese consumer goods. However, as more ethnic 
Russians leave and legal and illegal Chinese immigrants flood the region, Russia‘s 
leaders fear a silent Chinese takeover.  
Chinese citizens…visit Chinese-operated health clinics, and Chinese men even 
marry Siberian women, whose husbands are either perpetually drunk or already 




In another generation, the Russian Far East may be ―Russian‖ in name only. 
                                                 
27











China‘s military expansion is another concern for Russia‘s leaders as the pace and 
scale of Chinese modernization and professionalization of its armed forces has grown.  
Since the two governments signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation 
in December 1992, China has purchased more defense items from the Russian 





now that the Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing more 
sophisticated armaments, Moscow confronts the uncomfortable choice of either 
seeing its Chinese market decrease dramatically or agreeing to sell even more 
advanced weapons to Beijing, a decision that could destabilize military force 




 to Russia‘s disfavor.  
The Chinese are currently investing heavily in a blue-water navy that is meant to 
include several aircraft carriers. Recent developments like the unveiling of the J-20, 
China‘s newest domestically produced ―stealth fighter,‖ the new ―carrier-killing‖ anti-
ship ballistic missile, and the 2007 successful test of an anti-satellite missile all indicate 
that China is taking its military modernization seriously. At least for now, China‘s 
military interests seem to be oriented toward Taiwan, the United States, and the South 
East Asian region. However, the Chinese military exercise of 2009, codenamed Kuayue 
(Stride), dealt with the PLA‘s ability to rapidly move forces from across China. This 
included moving troops from the China‘s far west military region, Lanzhou, to its 
northeast military region, Shenyang, which borders Russia‘s Far East.
33
 While it does not 
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appear that China has any intention to increase tensions with its Russian neighbor any 
time soon, Russia‘s leaders view the future with growing concern.   
In the newest Russian Military Doctrine, territorial claims against the Russian 
Federation are explicitly listed as potential external threats.  Between 1858 and 1860, the 
Russian Empire annexed previously held Chinese territories along the Amur River that 
are equal in size to that of France and Germany combined.
34
 The Russian Federation‘s 
concern is that with the shift in economic and military power between the two countries 
in the RFE and the changing demographic situation in the region may provide the 
Chinese with additional justification with which to press their claims to territory that once 
belonged to them. 
 
Threats Everywhere 
The Russian Federation seriously views a potential threat from NATO on its 
western border, the potential for invasion or attack along its southern flank in the 
Caucasus or Central Asia, and a threat to its Far East territories from China. If Russia‘s 
political and military leaders believe that an attack could come from any one (or 
combination) of these areas then they must also conclude that they currently lack the 
conventional military assets to effectively defend against such an attack. The only 
Russian force currently capable of deterring or defeating a major attack against the 
Russian Federation is the nuclear weapons in its arsenal. A report produced in 2004 by 





 Milan V. Vego, ―Russia and the Return of Geopolitics,‖ 14. 
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the Ministry Defense, the Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation,  
implicitly suggests that Russia cannot face a militarily advanced state [i.e. the 
United States or China] or a coalition of states [i.e. NATO] without engaging its 
nuclear capability‖  
 
due to the current weakness of conventional forces.
35
 This conclusion has been 
demonstrated by the Russian military exercises, Zapad-99 and Stability 2008, which both 
ended in a Russian ―victory‖ only after it escalated into a nuclear exchange. The Russian 
nuclear triad makes ICBMs employable on all potential fronts and allows them to be used 
against the attacking forces and to target the state(s) that initiated the attack against the 
Russian Federation. Except for the strategic bombers, these weapons could be launched 
against an attack force and hit their target in less than an hour. No other weapon in the 
current Russian arsenal allows for Russia‘s military forces to respond against an attacking 
force or state with such speed and devastation. 
 
Faulty Perception 
Despite all these perceived vulnerabilities to the Russian Federation, it is difficult 
to understand why the Russians believe that any state would be willing to attack the 
Russian Federation and risk a nuclear response. The fact is that Russia today and in the 
near-future faces a rather mild threat environment when it comes to external threats to the 
existence of the Russian Federation. Threats to Russia‘s territorial integrity or existence 
are more likely to come from internal forces such as terrorist groups or insurgencies like 
those found in Chechnya and the rest of the Caucasus. These are threats for which nuclear 
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weapons are impracticable, infeasible, and ultimately ineffective. Nuclear weapons 
represent the ultimate broadsword at a time when what Russia‘s national security 
establishment needs is a scalpel with which to selectively target terrorist cells, insurgent 
groups, secessionists, and anti-government movements hiding amidst the domestic 
population.  
Russia‘s current possession of nuclear weapons alone deters the chance of any 
state – nuclear or non-nuclear – attempting to engage in a conflict with the Russian 
Federation. Although a Great Powers conflict is always possible and Russia‘s military 
must to be prepared for its eventuality as any nation does, its likelihood in the current 
global environment is low. Even the 2010 Russia Military Doctrine admits a ―decline in 
the likelihood of large-scale war involving the use of conventional means of attack and 
nuclear weapons being unleashed against the Russian Federation.‖
36
 The United States is 
exhausted from war and still focused on its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
United States is unlikely to seek out any new military conflicts, particularly with a 
nuclear power such as Russia whose cooperation it needs to pursue other foreign policy 
objectives such as stabilizing Afghanistan, arms control, resolving the Iranian and North 
Korean nuclear issues, and engaging in international counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism efforts. 
Russia‘s leaders have a valid concern about the expansion of military alliances 
such as NATO, that it is not a member of, closer to its border that could place potentially 
hostile assets closer to its territory and constrain Russian foreign and military policy 
objectives. This concern may be due to the expanding role of NATO based on the 
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Alliance‘s decision to become involved in Afghanistan. However, this must be viewed in 
some context. NATO became involved in Afghanistan because it invoked Article 5 of the 
NATO Charter for the first time in its history after a major provocation against one of its 
founding members on the morning of September 11, 2001 which resulted in almost three-
thousand civilian casualties by terrorist extremists. The Russian Federation would have to 
be prepared to commit a similar provocation, such as an attack on a current NATO 
member state, to warrant a NATO attack. Russia‘s leaders would also have to assume that 
NATO would be willing to risk a nuclear confrontation if it decided to engage in military 
action against the Russian Federation, and there is no indication that any NATO member 
has the desire to raise the stakes to that of a nuclear war. 
Russia‘s leaders should also look to recent developments regarding the NATO 
alliance. NATO‘s operations in Afghanistan have exposed the difficulties the alliance 
faces in its ability to mobilize and supply soldiers and military equipment outside the 
European theater for sustained operations and public opinion in many NATO states has 
turned decidedly against the Afghanistan conflict. As with the United States, a sense of 
war fatigue has set in that will likely prevent NATO from seeking out a military 
confrontation that would require the deployment of substantial assets including ground 
forces in the near future. The fact that certain NATO members resisted additional 
expansion during the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit should be a sign to Russia‘s leaders 
that even the European states feel that there should be limits on NATO expansion when it 
comes to Russian interests. Finally, Russian ties with certain European states have 
improved as witnessed by the negotiations to purchase as many as four $700 million 




 the completion of Nord Stream pipeline project that delivers 47 percent of 
natural gas directly to Germany; and the recent thaw in relations between Russia and 
Poland following the change in Polish government in 2007 and the April 2010 plane 




Meanwhile, Russo-Chinese relations are the best they have been in years with 
China representing one of Russia‘s major trading partners.
39
 Although Russia‘s leaders 
may view a potential threat to Russia‘s Far East from Chinese encroachment over the 
long-term, so long as China does not make an overt claim or attempt to annex the RFE 
Russia‘s leaders are unlikely to increase tensions in the region. In the meantime, they will 
benefit from Chinese investment and development in the region and profit from the 
revenues derived from resource exports.  
China‘s military expansion and modernization is also oriented more toward South 
East Asia and at potentially pushing out, or at least minimizing, the U.S. presence in the 
South Pacific. China‘s planned expansion of its navy, its increasingly aggressive behavior 
toward its neighbors and willingness to throw its economic and military weight around, 
and its continued preoccupation with reasserting control over Taiwan indicate that 
China‘s military ambitions and interests will be more directed toward its south-eastern 
neighbors and the United States rather than against Russia.  
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Finally, while China may pose a threat to Russia‘s Far East, it does not threaten 
Russia‘s existence. The  reason that it would be difficult for Russia to reinforce the RFE 
in the event of a conflict – long distance, difficult Siberian terrain, and lack of adequate 
transportation infrastructure – is the same reason that a ground attack by PLA forces 
aimed at western Russia would fail: the vast wilderness of Siberia is a defense all its 
own.
40
 Also, both states are nuclear powers which in-and-of-itself is a major deterrent 
factor, but in this respect Russia has a decided advantage over the Chinese numerically in 
terms of actual nuclear weapons and fifty years worth of Cold War experience where 
nuclear war was a real and potential threat. China has approximately 240 nuclear 
weapons in its inventory, compared to Russia‘s 11,000.
41
 Of these it is believed that no 
more than  
20 [are] operational intercontinental ballistic missiles -- each carrying a single 
warhead.…The U.S. intelligence community anticipates that, at best, China will 




Compare this to Russia‘s  
667 strategic delivery platforms capable of carrying approximately 3,000 nuclear 
warheads. Most of these are land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) under the command of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF). The Russian 
Navy also has long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads based on 
its 14 strategic missile submarines, while the Russian Air Force has 79 strategic 
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Ballistic Missile Defense 
 Another variable that factors into Russia‘s threat perception and reliance on 
nuclear weapons will be the United State‘s development and deployment of an anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) defense system. The U.S. decision to pursue this technology has 
raised major fears in the Russian military that these platforms are specifically targeted 
against Russian nuclear capabilities despite U.S. claims to the contrary. While the 
capacity of this technology is improving, at this time it is nowhere near as capable as 
some might fear. An ABM system must be close to 100 percent effective to make it a 
viable defensive weapon which is extremely difficult to achieve. However, Russia‘s 
leaders have to contend with the possibility that increased investment and testing will 
eventually yield a relatively reliable ABM system able to target tactical and strategic 
nuclear missiles during any one of the three launch phases (boost, mid-course, terminal). 
 If the United States is able to successfully perfect this technology then it would 
have the potential to compromise Russia‘s nuclear deterrence capability. Also, it would 
eliminate the Russian Federation‘s last surefire means of defending against an attack on 
its territory. If the United States can defend itself from incoming ICBMs (and this 
technology were to be shared with NATO countries) and it already maintains a 
conventional advantage over Russian forces, then Russia‘s actual and perceived 
vulnerability to attack increases substantially. 
 The simplest and most effective means of countering an ABM system is to 
overwhelm it. First, Russian nuclear weapons have carried decoys and penetration aids 
for decades, long before the United States began to invest heavily in ABM systems. This 
ensures that warheads on their terminal approach will have a greater chance of confusing 
27 
ABM systems and surviving to hit their targets. However, U.S. ABM systems will 
eventually target missile during their initial boost phase before the warheads separate 
from the missile. Therefore, the Russian Federation may have to compensate also with 
more nuclear missiles. Firing off more missiles than can possibly be intercepted during 
the boost phase and having each missile carry multiple warheads ensures that even if a 
large percentage of missiles are knocked out by the ABM system, enough warheads will 
still reach their targets to devastate the enemy. Therefore, any potential attack on the 
Russian Federation would continue to remain too costly.  
The U.S. plans for the deployment of the ABM system under the Phase Adaptive 
Approach currently include targeting nuclear missiles during their mid-course and 
terminal phase. An ABM system for targeting missiles during their initial boost phase 
was in development but has recently been cancelled.
44
 However, it should be assumed 
that research will continue into such a system and that it will eventually become part of 
the U.S.‘s ABM shield. The result is that if the Russian Federation wishes to maintain an 
effective nuclear deterrent that can penetrate or survive an ABM system, then they will 
have to maintain or increase the number of launch vehicles and warheads per missile. 
This will minimize the effectiveness of any ABM by requiring an ever increasing number 
of interceptors and a high interception rate.  
However, such an attempt to counter an ABM system will eventually reach a limit 
due to the constraints outline in the New START treaty signed by the United States and 
the Russia Federation in 2010. The new treaty limits both sides to no more than 1,550 
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deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems (air, sea, and 
land based).
45
 Instead of being concerned with a ceiling on warheads and vehicles, the 
Russian Federation may become more focused on the floor number of vehicles and 
warheads that it cannot cross below without imperiling its nuclear deterrent capability in 
respect to a missile defense system. If the United States is unable to reach an agreement 
with the Russian Federation regarding its missile defense program, then Russia may have 
no choice but to either cease reductions or even withdrawal from current treaties to 
increase their nuclear forces in an attempt to maintain enough weapons to overwhelm any 
missile defense system and ensure Russian deterrent capability. The fewer number of 
deployable strategic warheads and vehicles allowed under the current treaty in 
conjunction with the current weakness of Russia‘s conventional forces will place Russia 
at a severe disadvantage. When considering this alongside U.S. missile defense systems 
that may neutralize or minimize Russian nuclear deterrent capacity it is no wonder that 
the Russian feel vulnerable.  
U.S. efforts to develop and deploy a missile defense system provide an additional 
reason why the Russian Federation will become increasingly dependent on nuclear 
weapons for its national security. As the U.S. system becomes more effective and is 
increasingly deployed, Russia‘s leaders will have to determine whether they currently 
maintain enough strategic vehicles and warheads that can penetrate a missile defense to 
reach their targets thereby ensuring a Russian nuclear deterrent capability. Depending on 
how effective they perceive the U.S. missile defense to be, they may conclude that they 
must increase the number of vehicles and/or warheads per missile to maintain a deterrent 
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capacity. Even if Russian conventional forces were to improve substantially in the future 
they could not protect Russia from a nuclear attack. A nuclear attack can only be deterred 
with a nuclear response of equal or greater destruction. Therefore, the Russian leadership 
would feel that it has no choice other than to increase the deployment of nuclear vehicles 
and warheads. 
 
Perception versus Reality 
The conclusions that can be drawn in this section are that the leaders of the 
Russian Federation perceive an international environment that emphasizes external 
military threats to the Federation‘s existence. Based on Russia‘s geographic 
vulnerabilities and history of invasion, Russia‘s threat perception is not entirely 
misplaced. However, from a Western perspective, it appears to be greatly exaggerated 
when it comes to the possible threats posed by NATO, China, or the United States. These 
three realize that the Russian Federation‘s nuclear forces are still powerful and capable 
weapons, and even an ill-equipped and under-trained conventional military of one million 
men can inflict a significant amount of damage. NATO, China, nor the United States has 
any intention of becoming engaged in a conventional or nuclear armed conflict with the 
Russian Federation, however Russian analysis of the threat environment appear to 
specifically point toward such a likelihood. However, it is important to understand that 
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The fact remains that external threats dominate Russia‘s current threat perception, 
whether outsiders consider them to be right or wrong, realistic or not. So long as Russia‘s 
leaders believe that they are geographically vulnerable, susceptible to invasion by 
external forces, and do not consider their conventional military forces capable of 
deterring or repelling an attack on the Russian Federation, then it makes sense for them to 
adopt a policy that promotes nuclear weapons which increases their reliance on them. 
Nuclear weapons provide a credible deterrent against attack, compensate for Russia‘s 
vulnerable geographic position and currently weak conventional forces, allow for 
devastating retaliation, can be used in a timely manner, and can be employed anywhere 
along Russia‘s periphery (or in the world for that matter). Russia‘s conventional military 
forces cannot fulfill all these functions without a massive investment in modernization, 
training, and expansion of force that still could not guarantee to provide all the benefits of 
nuclear weapons and are beyond Russia‘s current capability to fund and man without 











CHAPTER FOUR: RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE 
 
 The 2000 and 2010 releases of Russia‘s military doctrine provide analysts with a 
view of the major issues, priorities, and policies of the Russian Federation. In particular, 
they allow the United States and other states to understand current Russian policies and 
anticipate future actions. One of the most beneficial points of order identified by these 
documents is the conditions under which the Russian Federation would employ nuclear 
weapons. The second is the articulation of the specific threats that the Russian state views 
toward itself and its allies. Finally, a close analysis of Russia‘s military doctrine indicates 
that the Russian Federation is already leaning toward favoring nuclear weapons. 
 The 2010 Russian Military Doctrine (RMD), like the 2000 version, identifies and 
outlines four types of potential conflicts: 
 armed conflict (basically, a small-scale clash between two states or within one 
state similar to the war in Chechnya); 
 local war (war with limited goals that affects only the interests of the 
immediate participants — a good example is the 2008 Russian-Georgian war); 
 regional war (war that involves significant forces, including naval and 
airspace, which affects a large region and perhaps even coalitions of states); 
and 
 large-scale war (war with radical, far-reaching goals that involves all or most 
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Point sixteen of the RMD 2010 version explicitly states that nuclear weapons could 
potentially be employed in the latter two scenarios
48
 and that a ―conventional regional 
war could escalate to the nuclear level.‖
49
 In addition, the  
Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the 
utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it 
and/or its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation 
involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is 




This language tightens the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used. The 
2000 version of the RMD allowed for the use of nuclear weapons ―in situations critical 
for [the] national security of Russia…‖ a phrase open to interpretation.
51
 However, the 
2010 RMD still represents an expansion of the role of nuclear weapons which was 
limited only to global war by the 1993 RMD.
52
 Finally, the fact that the 2010 version 
includes an allowance for the employment of nuclear weapons in response to a 
conventional attack means that unofficially the Russian Federation maintains a first-use 
policy, albeit under a strict condition.
53
 However, even the phrase ―when the existence of 
the state is under threat‖ can be open to interpretation and depend on whoever happens to 
be the President of Russia at the time and how they choose to interpret this phrase. 
 Although these are the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be 
employed, according to the RMD, the primarily purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent 
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―the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of 
conventional means of attack [a large-scale war or regional war].‖
54
 However, 
policymakers should take note of the fact that since 1993 the Russian Federation has 
implicitly adopted a first-use policy and altered the conditions under which they would 
utilize nuclear weapons. By the time the next military doctrine document is issued, the 
conditions under which nuclear weapons could be utilized could once again be expanded 
with corresponding language that is easily open to interpretation for the explicit purpose 
of lowering the threshold for the utilization of nuclear weapons. This may become 
especially pertinent should the planned modernization of conventional forces fail to come 
about or advance far enough; if the political environment along the periphery of the 
Russian Federation becomes more volatile; or if the threat perception of the Russian 
Federation increases substantially. 
 Many of the main external military dangers listed explicitly identify NATO and 
vaguely the United States and China as the main potential adversaries. The 2010 Russian 
Military Doctrine lists the following as the primary external military dangers facing the 
Russian Federation:  
 
a) the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms 
of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member 
countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding 
the bloc;  
 
b) the attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and to 
undermine strategic stability; 
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c) the deployment (buildup) of troop contingents of foreign states (groups of 
states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its 
allies and also in adjacent waters; 
 
d) the creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining 
global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-
missile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of 
strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems; 
 
e) territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and interference 
in their internal affairs; 
 
f) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile 
technologies, and the increase in the number of states possessing nuclear 
weapons; 
 
g) the violation of international accords by individual states, and also 
noncompliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of 
arms limitation and reduction; 
 
h) the use of military force on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian 
Federation in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law; 
 
i) the presence (emergence) of seats of armed conflict and the escalation of such 
conflicts on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its 
allies; 
 
j) the spread of international terrorism; 
 
k) the emergence of seats of interethnic (interfaith) tension, the activity of 
international armed radical groupings in areas adjacent to the state border of the 
Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, the presence of territorial 
contradictions and the growth of separatism and violent (religious) extremism in 




NATO is listed as the first of eleven ―main external dangers‖ yet it refers only to 
NATO expansion and its willingness to operate outside the European theater instead of 
couching it as a direct threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. This may 
have been meant to prevent an escalation of tensions between Russia and NATO; 
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however, the significance of NATO‘s listing as the first ―main danger‖ should not be 
ignored. The 2000 Russian National Security Concept cited NATO as a threat to the 
Russian Federation as well, specifically addressing its eastward expansion and its 
undertaking of operations ―outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security 
Council sanction.‖
56
 Also, included was reference to the ―possible emergence of foreign 
military bases and major military presences in immediate proximity of Russian 
borders.‖
57
 This is likely a subtle reference to the establishment of NATO infrastructure 
in new member states, primarily in Eastern Europe and U.S. military bases in 
Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics in support of the U.S. operations there.  
In addition, of the eleven external threats in the RMD 2010, NATO is the only 
one that is explicitly identified, all of the other bullets refer to generalized threats (i.e. 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, etc.) even when it is obvious which state(s) may be the 
target of the bullet point. Bullet D, for example, specifically refers to the threat posed by 
the development of strategic missile defense system which is currently only being 
seriously pursed by the United States of America with its European allies. Point E refers 
to territorial claims against the Russian Federation which most likely is a reference 
toward China, which may lay a claim to territory in Russia‘s Far East that once belonged 
to the Chinese Emperors.
58
 The other main territorial claim that the RF has to fear is the 
dispute with Japan over the status of the South Kuril Islands aka the Northern 
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 However, neither country is referred to by name. Therefore, the explicit 
mentioning of NATO and its listing as the first of eleven external threats may be 
symbolic and indicate that Russia‘s leadership feels threatened by more than just NATO 
expansion and its global operations.   
Russia‘s leaders may not be able to view NATO as anything other than a threat. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost a substantial portion of its 
strategic depth along its western border, a direction from which many invasions have 
come. The loss of Belarus and Ukraine in particular pushed the Russian border back to 
what it was during the 17th century. The collapse of the communist regimes in the 
former-satellite states gave rise to states that were more often than not decidedly anti-
Russian and sought closer ties with the West. Soon after, a number of these states were 
permitted to join the NATO alliance which placed these countries under NATO 
protection and provided them with the other benefits associated with membership. 
Increased NATO expansion east established alliance troops and infrastructure 
closer to the Russian border and closer to the major urban and industrial regions of 
internal Russia placing them at risk. While NATO has never indicated that it has any 
intent to attack Russia – point 33 of NATO‘s 2010 Strategic Concept explicitly states 
―NATO poses no threat to Russia. [emphasis added]‖
60
 – and the fact that it is an 
inherently defensive organization, Russia‘s leaders had to realize that if it chose to, 
NATO could pose a major challenge in the event of a military conflict. This can be seen 
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by the common reference to ―groups of states‖ in Russian military documents when 
referencing external threats. References regarding concern over military modernization 
and the ―growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers‖ are also commonly 
cited along with the need to overcome it.
61
 These leading powers are likely Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all core NATO members. 
 When considering the information regarding conditions under which the Russian 
Federation would consider employing nuclear weapons; the specific external threats it 
identifies; and certain references throughout the rest of the 2010 Russian Military 
Doctrine; it becomes clear that Russia‘s leadership still believes that nuclear weapons 
fulfill a critical function in Russian national security. While Russia‘s leaders hope that 
this increased role is only temporary until its conventional forces can recover, as was the 
case during the 1990s, in all likelihood the looser restrictions for nuclear weapons are 
here to stay and whether Russians realize it or not, many of the external threats they 
articulate can most easily be defeated or deterred by its nuclear arsenal.
62
 This fact only 
increases the appeal of nuclear weapons. 
 Although Russia‘s conventional forces are not powerless by any means, they are 
much weaker and less effective in the 21st century. Russia‘s conventional military, 
particularly its ground forces, are plagued by low morale, weak leadership and training, 
and outdated equipment. In addition, the Russian military primarily depends on a 
conscript force whose period of service has been reduced to a mere 12 months. This short 
service period makes for ill-trained and ill-prepared soldiers. The weakness of Russia‘s 
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conventional forces was highlighted by the recent war with Georgia in 2008. This 
included the inability of the Russian Air Force to establish air superiority during the 
conflict, the loss of several air force jets to Georgian air defense, and the inability to 
employ precision-guided munitions during the conflict. 
The general consensus by Russian and foreign experts is that Russia‘s 
conventional military forces are inherently weak and unprepared for a 21st century 
conflict. They may be able to confront and defeat any of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
states with limited difficulty in isolation or even in combination, but at this time would be 
at a major disadvantage against the conventional forces of major military powers such as 
China, Germany, or the United States even in isolation. If conventional forces are unable 
to effectively discharge their responsibilities and cannot confront the external threats 
outlined, then nuclear weapons become the only effective means of deterring and 
defeating some of the external threats outlined in the RMD. Since Russia‘s leaders are 
aware of the fact that their conventional military forces fall short in many areas they must 
also realize that the only available option then becomes a greater reliance on nuclear 
weapons. 
 Whether intentional or not, many of the external threats listed in the 2010 RMD 
are directly related to Russia‘s nuclear capability. Bullet D refers to the deployment of 
missile defense systems and bullet F refers to nuclear proliferation and the increase in 
potential nuclear weapons states. The rise of these two concerns would diminish Russia‘s 
nuclear trump card. The deployment of an effective missile defense system could 
minimize the effectiveness of a nuclear attack, requiring more missile launches per target 
to increase the probability of penetrating a missile defense system, or potentially render 
39 
nuclear weapons obsolete if the system is effective enough. Meanwhile, an increase in the 
number of states that possess nuclear weapons would increase the amount of damage 
such a state could inflict on Russia if it decided to attack or counter-attack. In addition, 
nuclear weapons proliferation would constrain Russia‘s military options unless it wanted 
to risk a nuclear conflict, even one of limited proportions.  
 Russia‘s concerns about NATO and territorial claims against the Russian 
Federation, bullets A and E respectively, are two external threats that nuclear weapons 
are ideal solutions for. Should a threat emerge regarding either of these bullets, then 
nuclear weapons provide an effective deterrent or means of retaliation should 
conventional forces fail in this endeavor. However, it should be stressed that at this time 
there does not appear to be any direct threat posed by NATO to the Russian Federation, 
regardless of what may be written in the 2010 RMD. Also, the only substantial territorial 
claims that may be of concern for the Russian Federation are in the RFE with China and 
Japan. China does not want to engage in any kind of military conflict with Russia because 
it would be counterproductive to its own goals at this time and because Russia is a 
nuclear power. Also, Japan does not wish to engage in a military conflict with Russia 
either and is prevented from resolving it through military force due to its pacifist 
constitution. 
 The Russia Federation appears to have intentionally outlined potential external 
threats that it must know that it cannot at this time easily defend against using its 
conventional forces. Russia‘s concerns about NATO, deployment of missile defense 
systems, territorial claims against it, and the increase in states possessing nuclear 
weapons all are related to Russia‘s reliance on nuclear weapons and either threaten them 
40 
or require their usage. Bullet C refers to the deployment of potentially hostile troops 
along Russia‘s periphery. Once again, if these foreign troops pose a threat and if all other 
avenues fail to remove their presence then it will be up to the conventional military forces 
to deal with this threat if it cannot be resolved diplomatically. If Russian conventional 
military are unable to handle the situation then nuclear weapons may have to be used (or 
threaten their use) to deter, defeat, or force a retreat of the threat. With the current state of 
Russia‘s conventional forces and the outlined external threats Russia‘s leaders feel they 
face, the Russian Federation is intentionally moving itself toward a reliance on nuclear 
weapons because it will be the only means by which it can face these perceived threats. 
  
41 
CHAPTER FIVE: RUSSIA’S POPULATION PROBLEMS 
 
 One of the reasons why the Russian Federation will become increasingly 
dependent on nuclear weapons for national security is because of its inability to draw 
upon enough individuals to fill the ranks of its armed forces. In addition to its geographic 
size, Russia has always depended heavily on its large population.  
Indeed, manpower has traditionally been seen as an almost limitless resource, 
often providing Russia the means to overcome shortcomings in other areas such 




However, over the next few decades, Russia‘s ability to do so will diminish as numerous 
social factors begin to affect both the Russian military and civilian population. The 
spread of numerous infectious diseases, external causes of death, low fertility rates, high 
mortality, the legacy of poor health care services, lack of funding for health 
infrastructure, and overall poor health of the general population are leading to the decline 
of the Russian people. As the health of the domestic population diminishes, it impacts the 
state‘s ability to recruit healthy soldiers by decreasing the pool of eligible candidates able 
to serve in the military. It also increases the burden on the state by increasing the demand 
for healthcare services and on the economy as there are fewer individuals able to enter 
the workforce. The numerous social problems facing the Russian Federation will be 
explored below; however, this should not be considered an exhaustive list. 
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Declining Birth Rates 
 The Russian Federation faces a fundamental problem when it analyzes its 
population: every year more people die than are born. While the Russian Federation is 
not the only European state to suffer from a negative population growth rate, its negative 
growth in one of the highest at -0.47.
64
 Out of the 233 countries listed on the CIA‘s 
World Factbook for annual Population Growth Rate, Russia ranks 222. Also, World 
Factbook‘s population estimate lists Russia‘s population as one of the lowest having 
already dropped below 140 million.
65
 
 Russia‘s leaders are fully aware of the population decline and in 2000, then-
President Vladimir Putin listed population decline as the first out of sixteen acute 
problems facing the country.
66
 Russia‘s population is decreasing by as much as 750,000 
every year, primarily due to the excess of deaths over births.
67
 This is about the number 
of new conscripts that must be recruited every year by the Russian Armed Forces to 
maintain a size of 1.1 million.
68
As of 2005, male births already equal the number of 
individuals that currently need to be conscripted every year. However, not all males 
survive until their draft year (minimum 18 years of age) and even then not all males are 
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eligible for service. Therefore, at this time not enough males are born within the Russian 
Federation to meet the current recruitment quotas eighteen years down the road. If births 
continue to decline as they have in the past, then the pool of eligible candidates will only 
become smaller making it impossible for the Russian Armed forces to maintain a million 
man army under 12 month contracts. 
 There are a number of factors for the low birth rate. The primary amongst them is 
the low fertility rate. Russia currently has a fertility rate of 1.4 children born per woman
69
 
but would require 2.1 to simply meet the natural replacement rate.
70
 Russia would need 
almost a doubling of the fertility rate just to maintain its current population levels; 
however, this is not expected anytime soon despite the limited efforts to boost fertility. 
This low fertility rate is compounded by the fact that two-thirds of all births in Russia are 
born by females in the prime childbearing age group of 20 to 29, and this specific age 
group is estimated to decline over the next two decades.
71
 In addition, ―fifteen to 20 
percent of all Russian families experience infertility, with 10 to 15 percent of females 
infertile, and some 5 to 10 percent of males.‖
72
 Infertility is exacerbated amongst women 
since ―two-thirds of all pregnancies now end in abortions.‖
73
 In 2008, there were 1.2 
million abortions compared to 1.7 million births making abortions and births almost 
                                                 
69
 ―The World Factbook 2011 (Russia).‖ 
 
70
 Holachek, Russia’s Shrinking Population and the Russian Military’s HIV/AIDS Problem, 7. 
 
71










 It should be noted that the recorded number of abortions may in fact be higher as 
some of them take place in private or illegal clinics from which statistics are 
unavailable.
75
 Of the 1.2 million women who undergo an abortion,  
30,000 of them become sterile, many from the estimated 180,000 illegal 





The rate of illegal abortions is unlikely to change any time soon as few cases of illegal 
abortion are ever investigated and even fewer are ever prosecuted.
77
 The low fertility and 
high abortion rate are heavily influenced by the current economic situation in Russia. 
―According to a study published in late June 2001…30 percent of young females do not 
wish to have children because of the economic hardships they confront.‖
78
 The current 
rate of infertility and abortions are robbing the Russian Federation of over a million births 
every year and are continually reducing the number of women able to bear children.  
 
Amalgamate of Health Issues 
 HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB) are just two of the major infectious diseases 
culling the Russian population. While these and other diseases differ in the ways they kill 
their victims and are spread and treated in different ways, they often affect the same high-
risk groups and co-infections are common. Analysis of infectious diseases must also 
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include illicit intravenous drug use as this is a common means by which disease is spread 
and drug users represent one of the primary high-risk groups. However, the importance of 
high-risk groups is beginning to diminish, especially in regards to illicit drug users, as 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS are becoming more generalized amongst the Russian 
population. Intravenous drug use, high rates of co-infections, and poor testing and record 
keeping make it extremely difficult to establish a clear picture of the health issues facing 
the Russian Federation. This does not even include intentional attempts by local or 
central government officials to adjust the data, for political reasons, to present a more 
favorable picture for domestic or international audiences. 
In particular, high rates of co-infection often mean that one disease may be 
recorded as the primary cause of death but ignores the underlying infection. For example, 
a patient‘s record may indicate that they died from pneumonia but ignore the HIV/AIDS 
they suffered from which would have made that individual more susceptible to infection 
and unable to fight it off. This creates misleading and skewed data as complete statistics 
go unrecorded and make it difficult to track the incidence, prevalence, and mortality of 
these diseases. Also, health agencies and non-governmental organizations often 
specialize or record data separately by individual illnesses. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider the available data cumulatively as the Russian Federation‘s health problems are 





 HIV/AIDS is one of the most destructive diseases currently ravaging the Russian 
population. At this time, an HIV-positive diagnosis is all but a death sentence as the 
average life expectancy between the initial HIV-infection and death is estimated at no 
more than twelve years.
79
 This is largely due to the high cost and low availability of 
antiretroviral therapy which today has the ability to substantially extend the life of an 
HIV positive patient‘s life and improve their overall quality of life.
80
 The disease was 
initially concentrated in three high-risk groups: commercial sex workers, the prison 
population, and intravenous drug users.  
A recent [2005] study conducted in Saint Petersburg found 30 percent of injecting 
drug users to be HIV-positive. Various other studies have found HIV rates among 
commercial sex workers in Saint Petersburg to range between 30 to 60 
percent.…The HIV prevalence rate among Russia‘s large inmate population is 




These three high risk groups form a self-reinforcing cycle as sex workers may also be 
intravenous drug users or HIV-positive former prisoners have contact with sex workers 
(See Figure 2). However, the disease has started to break out from these three groups, 
through homosexual and heterosexual contact, as members of high-risk groups have 
contact with individuals outside this cycle who unknowingly become carriers themselves. 
Heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDs in particular has been on the rise. ―In 2005, 
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heterosexual transmission accounted for 32 percent of newly registered cases of HIV 




The Dynamic of how HIV/AIDS is Spread among Russia’s High Risk Groups 
 
 
Figure 2. Image in Jeffrey Holachek, Russia’s Shrinking Population and the Russian Military’s HIV/AIDS 
Problem (Atlantic Council of the United States, September 2006), 5, http://www.acus.org/docs/0609-
HIV_Russian_Military-Holachek.pdf. 
 
As referenced above, an exact estimate of how many people in Russia are actually 
infected with the HIV/AIDS (or other diseases) is impossible to determine and differs 
based on which government agency or international organization one chooses to 
reference.  
In September 2005, Dr. Vadim Pokrovskiy, Chief of Russia‘s Federal AIDS 
Center in Moscow and Russia‘s leading expert on HIV/AIDS, testified before the 
Russian Duma that a total of 330,500 Russians had been officially registered as 
having HIV or AIDS…[but] that the actual number of Russians living with HIV 
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UNAIDS‘s 2009 average estimate of the number of people living with HIV/AIDS is 
980,000 within an estimated range of 840,000 to 1,200,000.
84
 CIA World Factbook also 
estimates approximately 980,000 HIV/AIDS cases.
85
 However, according to some 
sources, the actual number of cases may run as high as 1.5
86
 or even two million.
87
  
This statistical outlook grows worse when considering the fact that the majority of 
those infected are Russian youth. Eighty percent of the HIV positive population is under 
the age of 30,
88
 and infection is relatively equal between males and females.
89
 The 
majority of newly registered HIV infections are among those 15-29 years of age.
90
 In 
contrast, in the United States and Western Europe, 70 percent of those infected are men 
over the age of 30.
91
 The increased infection rate for Russian women is likely due to the 
increase in heterosexual transmission.
92
 Also, ―[i]n 2005, over 11,000 pregnant women in 
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Russia tested positive for HIV‖ meaning that a certain percentage of children born 
already carry the fatal disease.
93
  
Therefore, not only are both genders being hit equally by this disease but it is 
primarily targeting Russia‘s future generations, even the unborn. The impact on the 15-29 
aged cohorts will reduce the number of individuals that will be able to both serve in the 
military and fill vacancies in civilian workforce. Competition between the two is also 
likely to increase with most young adults preferring the civilian workforce over military 
service due to the current poor conditions inside the military. The impact on females is 
especially important as it further reduces the number of women who will live to reach the 
prime childbearing age group of 20-29, and those that do and are infected with the virus 
are likely to pass it on to their children. Therefore, the impact of HIV/AIDs on the 
military is that fewer individuals will be able to serve because they are already infected 
with the HIV/AIDS virus when they are called up for draft. Also, the disease is currently 
reducing the number of women who will live to bear children which means that there will 




 Tuberculosis has become a major problem in Russia and its impact is 
compounded by the fact that those infected with TB are often co-infected with 
HIV/AIDS. However, attempting to estimate the number of individuals with this co-
infection is difficult at best as there is a gap between those that are known to be infected 




with both diseases; know they carry one but not the other; or do not know that they are 
infected with either. UNAIDS estimates that, globally, a third of all people living with 
HIV are co-infected with TB.
94
 As of 2009, it is believed that as many as two-thirds of 
Russians with AIDS at death were also suffering from TB, up from 50 percent five years 
ago.
95
 In addition, the spread of drug resistant TB and multi-drug resistant TB (MDR-TB) 
have started to increase in prevalence which will only make it harder to cure new TB 
cases.
96
  The World Health Organization estimates that as of 2009 there were 190,000 
cases of TB in Russia with a low/high estimate between 65 and 320 thousand 
respectively.
97
 Globally, of the 440,000 cases of MDR-TB in 2008, 38,000 were in 
Russia which indicates that MDR-TB is gaining a foothold.
98
 In 2007, a total of 24,000 
Russians died from TB.
99
 In comparison, in the United States, with a population twice the 
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Malnutrition and Deficiencies 
 As surprising it may seem for an industrialized state such as Russia, malnutrition 
is a major problem affecting all strata of society that has a significant impact on the 
development of the population, particularly its youngest members. One of the most 
surprising statistics was provided by the National Institute of Nutrition of the Russian 
Academy of Medical Sciences which determined that half of all newborn children were 
found to be iodine or calcium deficient.
101
 According to an article published in the 
February 2007 issue of Public Health of the Russian Federation, at the beginning of the 
decade starting with 2000: 
[A] Vitamin C deficit was found among 60 to 80 percent of the population 
regardless of income, a calcium [deficiency] among 40 to 60 percent, iron 
deficiency among 20 to 40 percent, folic acid among 70 to 80 percent, a 
vitamin B complex deficit among almost 40 percent, and IDD (iodine 




Vitamin deficiencies reduce a body‘s ability to fight off infection
103
 while a deficiency in 
calcium increases bone and skeletal illnesses.
104
 The rise in iodine deficiency is due to the 
fact that iodized salt has not been produced in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and little has been imported.
105
 ―In young children, iodine deficiency causes 
mental retardation.‖
106
 While the impact of these deficiencies may not be readily apparent 
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or have an immediate impact, over time they have the potential to drastically impact the 




 Alcoholism is a disease of epidemic proportions facing Russian society. 
According to the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, ―[a]lochol consumption is 
more than double the critical level set by the World Health Organization.‖
107
 As many as 
20 million Russians are referred to as being alcoholics.
108
 ―Poisoning by counterfeit 
alcohol kills 42,000 Russian every year,‖
109
 compared to 300 in the United States.
110
 In 
2001, accidental alcohol poisoning equated to a rate of 28.5 per 100,000 of the population 
which was 120 times the European average.
111
 Another ―75,000 die of alcohol-related 
diseases….[and] 500,000 die annually from diseases, crimes and accidents due to 
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 Russia also has one of the highest levels of per capita consumption among 
adults, listed at 18 liters of pure alcohol annually.
113
  
Alcohol abuse is also on the rise amongst Russian youth. The average age of 
people who begin drinking has decreased from 16 to 13 years.
114
 ―The total number of 
children aged 10-14 who drink alcoholic spirits rose 15.4% in 2008 (10.85 million).‖
115
 
The consequence of these factors is that thousands of Russians are dying every year, 
further adding to Russia‘s demographic decline. Working age males are the hardest hit by 
the effects of alcohol. ―Conservative estimates attribute 31-43% of deaths among 
working-age men to alcohol.‖
116
 This reduces the number of males who currently can or 
will be able to serve in the armed forces and the civilian work force. Meanwhile, those 
that suffer from alcoholism fare no better being functionally useless in either the military 
or civilian establishments. 
 
Other Health Issues 
 The health issues listed above provide only a snapshot of the problems facing the 
Russian population and by extension their ability to field a large military force. An in-
depth and exhaustive review of all the health and mortality issues plaguing the Russian 
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population is beyond the scope of this product. The purpose here is to focus attention on 
the fact the prevalence of communicable, non-communicable diseases, and external 
causes of death exist at high rates and often far higher than their European and Western 
counterparts; and these rates are steadily increasing in incidence, prevalence, and 
mortality. The net effect is that as the population decreases, there will be fewer 
individuals – particularly draft-eligible males – that can serve in the armed forces. In 
addition, there will be a negative impact on the economy and GDP growth as fewer 
Russians live to fill vacancies in the economy, or are healthy and able enough to fill 
them.  
 As indicated by the data, the impact of these illnesses and other issues is 
especially hard on Russian males. Sixty percent of Russian males smoke which increases 
the chance for cancer and future health complications.
117
 Meanwhile, the suicide rate 
among men is the second highest in the world and three times the rate in the United 
States.
118
 Also, ―external causes of death (murders, accidents, poisoning, traffic accidents, 
and the like)…are the second most common cause of death‖ in Russia among the general 
population.
119
 By comparison, worldwide, external causes of death fall between fifth and 
ninth on the list.
120
 The murder rate in Russia is especially high compared to other 
developed nations. In 2009, it is believed that there were some 46,200 murders, 2.5 times 
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the officially government statistics of 18,200.
121
 By comparison, there were only 16,000 
murders in the United States, a country with twice Russia‘s population and much looser 
firearm restrictions.
122
 It is estimated that as many as ―50 percent of 16-year-old males in 
Russia do not survive until age 60; [and] 40 percent of all males die between 16 and 60 
years of age.‖
123
 Drug use is also a growing concern amongst Russians with an estimated 
5 million addicts,
124
 the majority of them in the 18-30 year age range.
125
 Factor in 
Russian males‘ high share of alcoholism and share of traffic fatalities (over 70%),
126
 and 
their equal share of HIV/AIDs and TB infection, and the conclusion that must be reached 
is that without strong and immediate change in these trends, Russia is heading for a 
demographic catastrophe that it may not be able to recover from.  
 
Demographics is Destiny 
 Quantifying the impact of all these problems and issues is difficult if not 
impossible. Part of the problem stems from the fact that comprehensive studies of all 
these issues in conjunction have not been conducted. Domestic Russian government 
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agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations tend to focus 
their missions and data collection efforts on singular issues such as alcoholism, 
HIV/AIDS, or female reproduction. Therefore, professional analysis of how all these 
social problems fit in together, how they interact, and what their cumulative impact on 
the Russian population will be is difficult – if not impossible – to determine. This is 
compounded by the fact that there is extensive crossover between all these issues. An 
intravenous drug user suffering from malnutrition and infected with the HIV/AIDS virus 
is one such example of an individual that falls into three distinct categories. Or the death 
of an AIDS patient that is co-infected with the tuberculosis may only be recorded as a TB 
death and ignore the underlying infection which would have weakened their immune 
systems substantially. In addition, the magnitude of these problems is only now starting 
to emerge and catch the attention of institutions and researchers, so any research may still 
be in the early stages with no conclusions. 
How exactly all these numerous social and health problems will impact the future 
of the Russian population is unknown. However, based on the current statistical data and 
the current lack of government intervention the future looks bleak. The Russian state 
faces a demographic abyss that if goes uncorrected will spell disaster for the Russian 
population. The effects of these problems are already starting to be felt and are likely to 
increase in prominence as they mature and metastasize. The impact on Russia‘s military 
will be profound as the pool of eligible candidates for military service grows smaller with 
each passing year because of fewer male births, more male deaths, and a shortage of 
healthy able bodies.  
57 
Once again, nuclear weapons must fill this ever increasing gap in Russia‘s 
national security. As the number of individuals that can serve in the military becomes 
increasingly finite, it will be impossible for the Russian government to maintain a 
million-man army. If the Russian leadership reduces the size of its military forces to 
accommodate this reality, it will still leave them feeling vulnerable and unable to meet all 
of their military commitments and national security needs, especially considering their 
current threat perception. Therefore, nuclear weapons provide the ideal solution through 
which to overcome their manpower issues yet still provide an assurance of security and 
military success. Unless the demographic and social trends within Russian society are 
reversed, Russia‘s leaders will have no option but to increase their reliance on nuclear 














CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIA’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
 
Conventional Capability 
 Russia possesses substantial conventional military forces. In terms of raw figures, 
the conventional military of the Russian Federation represents a formidable force that 
would make any adversary think twice about becoming involved against it militarily. The 
Russian Federation has almost a million individuals in uniform at any one time and tens 
of thousands of pieces of military equipment at its disposal, everything from tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, to jet fighters, to cruisers and destroyers. However, closer 
examination of the equipment available and the status of current soldiers belie the raw 
numbers.  
First, most of the equipment fielded by ground, air, and sea forces was produced 
by the Soviet Union or is based on Cold War design. The production and distribution of 
new equipment that represents an improvement over the previous generation and that is 
appropriate for the changes in military conflict in the 21st century is slow. Maintenance 
and upgrades of current equipment are unevenly spread across the military and most 
often consist of the utmost minimum to ensure they continue to function and extend the 
service life of equipment as long as possible. 
 Second, the Russian Government has demonstrated that it does not believe that its 
own military industry currently has the ability to produce the weapons that Russian 
conventional forces will require in the future. This has been highlighted most recently by 
59 
a number of foreign weapons purchases including the French built Mistral-Class 
amphibious assault ship, and the decision to purchase Israeli produced unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs).
127
 Russia is also in talks to purchase 500 light armored vehicles from 
French military manufacturer Panhard.
128
 The contract could be worth as much as $260 
million and would provide ―3.1 ton armored vehicles…on a 4x4 wheel platform‖ for 
Russia‘s Federal Security Service border guards.
129
 On February 9, 2011, the Russian 
Defense Ministry signed a deal with private defense company Rheinmetall to build a 
combat training center for the Russia military.
130
  
The defense arm of the [Rheinmetall] is…Europe‘s top supplier of defense 
technology and security equipment for ground forces. It specializes in armor, 
gunnery, propellants and munitions manufacturing but has a fairly broad defense 
portfolio comprising training and simulation solutions as well as command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, target acquisition and 





The facility would provide training for brigade-size units and would provide modeling 
and simulated tactical combat situations.
132
 On March 5, 2011, it was also reported that 
the Ministry of Defense would be purchasing light armored vehicles for motor infantry 
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units from Rheinmetall Chempro.
133
 Finally, Russia may acquire as many as 3,000 Italian 
Iveco M65E vehicles, light multirole combat vehicles for the Russian army.
134
 
In total, Russia is expected to purchase as much as $12 billion in arms from 
European and Israeli companies over the next five years, much of it from Europe‘s 
premier defense contractors.
135
 Together, these and other actions show that the Russian 
military industrial complex is currently unable to produce weapons of the necessary type, 
quality, and sophistication and that the only alternative it to turn to foreign purchases to 
meet Russian military requirements. The benefit of foreign purchases is that it saves the 
RF massive amounts of money in research and development, construction, and allows for 
an increase in capability much faster than if it decided to achieve it on its own. The 
downside is that it diverts money away from state defense industries that could use the 
funds to develop the domestic capability and know-how on their own. Also, the Russians 
realize that such weapons purchases will only allow them catch-up so far and that they 
will never be able to purchase top-of-the-line weapons from abroad.
136
 Therefore, foreign 
purchases will not allow for an equalization of military capabilities. 
 Third, examination of the political debate surrounding military reform and 
modernization reveals that there is no clear consensus on what to do, how to do it, and 
what the effectiveness of previous reforms has been. Talk of military reform has been 
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ongoing since the collapse of the Soviet Union; however, the particular direction that it 
should go in has been unclear. Under former Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev (1997-
2001), a heavy emphasis was placed on the modernization and improvement of the 
Strategic Missile Forces (SMF). This was partially because Sergeyev was formerly the 
commander of the SMF; because it was believed that the nuclear forces would be the best 
way to protect the RF at a time that the Russian conventional forces were weakened;
137
 
and because it  
was justified by an irrefutable argument that the available limited funds could buy 
a reasonable modernization of the nuclear triad – but would disappear without a 




This policy of favoring the SMF was finally overturned by President Putin in 2001 and 
resulted in the removal of Sergeyev and his replacement with Sergei Ivanov.
139
 
 Since then, there have been several different plans for modernization, 
rearmament, and reform. The most significant proposals were to phase out conscription in 
favor of a professional all-volunteer military, however, to-date this has resulted in limited 
success and conscription is expected to continue for the time being. In fact, the only 
substantial change has been to decrease the number of circumstances under which a 
conscription deferment can be obtained and to make non-military civil service more 
unappealing. The goal of these two actions was to increase the number of males available 
for conscription and make it the more preferred choice of mandatory public service. The 
fact remains that Russian conventional forces continue to suffer from serious personnel 
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and equipment problems which undermine their ability to perform their duties and 
discharge their responsibilities. 
 Unlike in the United States and other Western nations, the military budget of the 
Russian Federation is not openly discussed in parliament or available for public 
scrutiny.
140
 This lack of transparency makes it difficult to know exactly how much money 
is devoted to defense overall, how much is allocated for each branch, or how the Ministry 
of Defense chooses to spend its funds.
141
 Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain how much 
money is actually devoted to modernization and reform and whether or not it is spent 
appropriately. Public statements by Ministry of Defense officials are constantly subject to 
change and sometimes contradict themselves making them questionable sources of 
information.  
Due to these issues, ascertaining the abilities and overall effectiveness of Russia‘s 
conventional forces must be based more on observations rather than official reports or 
statement. Therefore, the recent Russo-Georgian conflict in August of 2008 provided 
outside observers with an excellent opportunity to see Russian air, ground, and sea forces 
engaged in action. This conflict provides a microcosm for what could be expected from 
Russian forces in the event of any of the potential conflicts outlined in the Russian 
Military Doctrine. Post-war analysis of Russian performance is strikingly in contrast with 
Russian assertions of military prowess. Throughout the following analysis of Russia‘s 
conventional forces, comparisons of each branches‘ performance during the Georgian 
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 Russia‘s ground forces comprise the largest branch of Russia‘s conventional 
forces. Russia has always been a land power out of geographic necessity. The ground 
forces are the most important because most of the external threats that the RF faces, 
perceives to be facing, or is likely to face in the future emanate primarily along Russia‘s 
periphery. Therefore, ground forces are the most logical force with which to meet those 
threats. Naval and air force assets are mostly limited to supporting and complimentary 
roles in conventional conflicts. Despite the importance of ground forces to Russia‘s 
national security, they appear to be the weakest branch of all three. 
 
Personnel 
Russia‘s ground forces today suffer from a multitude of problems that more often 
than not go unaddressed. The first major problem is personnel. ―In line with the ongoing 
military reform, the Russian Armed Forces will be downsized to 1 million personnel by 
2016, enlisting 150,000 officers and about 745,000 soldiers‖ the majority of whom will 
be conscripts.
142
 Yet, there are currently consistent manpower shortages at every level. In 
November 2008, during the immediate post-war analysis between Russia and Georgia, 
Army-General Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff stated that ―[e]ighty-three 
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On January 1, 2008 conscription service was reduced from 2 years to 1 year.
144
 
This does not allow for enough time to appropriately train conscripts in their 
specialization nor allow for enough time to create proper unit cohesion. The declining 
demographics situation in the RF is already making it increasingly difficult to find 
eligible candidates for military service. Also, convincing Russian youths that military 
service is a promising career is challenging as reports of abuse and hazing, squalid living 
conditions, exploitation of ―conscripts and contract soldier by commanding officer for 




Meanwhile, there are more attractive and luring opportunities in the private sector 
that offer a better life and higher salary than could be achieved through military 
service.
146
 After multiple pay raises even as recently as 2006,  
platoon or company commanders – ranking from senior lieutenant to captain – are 
still paid less than escalator attendants in Moscow (8,000 rubles [around $285]). 
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As early as 1996, ―high school students rated ―army officer‖ as the least prestigious on a 
long list of occupations.‖
148
 The result is that the quality of many conscripts recruited 
every year, in terms of health and education, is decreasing as those who can, do anything 
possible to avoid service, leaving the military to recruit the least desirable candidates.  
Data collected on the spring 2005 conscription cycle showed that…45 percent had 
never held a job or studies at the postsecondary level, 5 percent had criminal 
records, 25 percent had not finished high school, nearly one-ninth were alcoholics 




The Russian Government has decided to attack the problem of finding conscripts 
not by improving conditions and clamping down on abuses, but by making it harder for 
Russian males to avoid service. Russian police in major cities are now used to help 
round-up conscripts.
150
 Raids have been performed on college dormitories to find 
students that have been draft dodging.
151
 The number of eligible deferments and waivers 
has been reduced from 25 to 16.
152
  
Particular attention has been focused on the higher education system, so that 





Civilian service, which has long been a popular alternative to military service, has 
been drastically altered to make it increasingly unappealing. Civilian service allows draft-
age young men the option of opting out of conventional military service and choosing 
                                                 
148
 Ibid., 63. 
 
149
 Ibid., 64. 
 
150






 Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military, 64. 
 
153
 Pavel Baev, ―Neither Reform Nor Modernisation: The Armed Forces Under and After Putin‘s 




 However, in July of 2002, then-President Putin signed 
legislation into law that obligated anyone choosing civilian service to serve for three-and-
a-half years, three times longer than the current conventional military conscripts.
155
 
―Furthermore, the law – which came into force in January 2004 – says that alternative 
service must be performed away from the individual‘s normal residence.‖
156
 Meanwhile, 
military conscripts are allowed to serve near their home. Therefore, choosing civilian 
service would place an individual far from home, increasing the economic burden on 
anyone who desires to pursue this alternative. The result has been unsurprising with only 
―186 out of about 155,000 draftees in the spring 2005 conscription cycle‖ selecting 
civilian service, and even then ―military commissioners often demand bribes (up to $800) 
even to accept application for alternative service.‖
157
 The Russian Government‘s solution 
to finding people to meet its military quotas is to invest more in forcing Russian males to 
serve as opposed to make military service more appealing and desirable. 
However, even if the Russian military could meets its yearly conscription quotas 
without difficulty and increase the amount of service required of new conscripts, this 
would do little to substantially improve unit cohesion or ground forces capability so long 
as the destructive practice of ―dedovshchina‖ exists and permeates the enlisted ranks. 
Dedovshchina is a system of ―institutionalized bullying by older conscripts‖ upon new 
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and lower levels of enlisted personnel.
158
 This abuse is believed to be responsible for 
numerous mutinies, suicides, and potentially thousands of avoidable deaths each year. In 




According to official figures, there are about a thousand non-combat deaths each 
year in the Russian armed forces but the well-informed Soldiers‘ Mothers 




Most of these deaths are a result of bullying and suicides of soldiers who can no longer 
face the abuse.
161
 What is worse is that this kind of abuse is not limited to the enlisted 
personnel. There are numerous accounts of officers abusing other officers or enlisted 
personnel which often result in serious injury and death.
162
 These kinds of abuses have 
created conditions of low morale amongst Russian soldiers and heavily contribute to 
Russian society‘s negative attitude toward the military and military service. 
The problems with the officer corps are not limited to physical abuse. Corruption 
and embezzlement have become systemic as military officials find ways to line their 
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 Ibid. By now, physical abuse is such an accepted part of Russian military life that many officers 
routinely use force themselves to discipline their soldiers; only the exceptional cases come to public notice. 
For example, in October 2002 a Captain Ilyasov was court-martialed in Yekaterinburg. He would regularly 
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68 
pockets at every opportunity.
163
 Accounts are falsified by commanders who collect 
salaries for soldiers who do not exist. Soldiers are hired out as slave labor by their 




theft alone amounted to $60 million…[and]…about 16,000 military personnel 
were charged with a variety of crimes, including 100 senior commanders and 




In 2008, of the over 20,000 recorded crimes involving the Armed Forces and other 
security departments by military prosecutors, one in four was committed by an officer, 
causing over 2 billion rubles ($56 million) in damages.
166
 Bribes to the correct 
individuals and of appropriate size can help someone avoid military service, get them a 
plum position, or a preferred stationing.
167
 Money allocated for salaries, barracks 
improvements, and even food is often siphoned off into personal pockets while soldiers 
live in squalor and go hungry.
168
 This sometimes leaves soldier with no choice other than 
to forage or beg for food. ―There are also disturbing reports of commanders…forcing 
[soldiers] into prostitution.‖
169
 Meanwhile,  
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[a]rms and ammunition disappear, perhaps to hunters, or gangsters or terrorist, but 
no-one knows. Fuel, spare parts and vehicles can be bought.…Vital parts of 




What is worse is that the Ministry of Defense and senior officials know that these abuses 
take place and do little if anything to punish the perpetrators or stop it from continuing.  
In April 2002, the Minister of Defense, visiting 20 Guards Army in the Moscow 
Military District, described the volume of theft there as ‗simply impermissible‘, 





Another alterative the Russian leadership has undertaken to help fill the ranks is 
to ease the restrictions regarding the recruitment of foreign citizen. ―According to the 
amended law, a citizen of any foreign country, aged 18-30, can now sign an initial 5-year 
contract to join the army.‖
172
 However, there are no plans at this time to fill the officer 
ranks with foreign nationals.
173
 As an incentive, recruits are offered Russian citizenship 
after three years of service.
174
 However, this policy is not expected to make a substantial 
difference in the Russian recruitment shortfall.  
The recruitment situation in Russian is only going to get worse as time goes by 
unless substantial improvements and reforms take place. According to Colonel Alexei 
Knyazev, the officer in charge of the army draft, as many as 133,000 young men are 
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evading the draft as of September 2010.
175
 Meanwhile, as many as 25-30 percent of 
conscripts were considered unfit for military service in 2007.
176
 In 2009, President 
Dimitri Medvedev announced that this number had increased to 40 percent.
177
 Igor 
Bykov, head of the defense ministry‘s medical department, reported that ―mental, 
musculoskeletal and drug-related illnesses, as well as TB and AIDS, topped the list of 
diseases that make young men unfit for military service.‖
178
 
The result is that ground forces personnel have low morale, are undernourished, 
are forced to endure humiliation and abuse by their fellow enlisted comrades and officers, 
and are poorly equipped and trained.  This creates ground forces that are unprepared to 
engage an adversary in almost any conflict without major preparation ahead of time. The 
exploitation of soldiers by their officers  
indicates that the average Russian officer does not see his soldiers as fellow 
servicemen or even as fellow human beings. There is no mutual respect between 





As a result, the ―Russian armed forces are rapidly losing the esprit de corps or military 
ethos which makes a military organization an effective fighting force (and politically 
reliable).‖
180
 If concrete action is not taken to alleviate these problems in the ranks, then 
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Russia‘s ground forces will be nothing more than mobs with guns leaving the Russian 
Federation vulnerable to outside attack. 
 
Equipment 
Equipment is also a major problem that plagues ground forces. Most of the 
equipment currently available was inherited from the Soviet Union or is based on Soviet 
design. Funding for even minimum maintenance of current weapons inventories is often 
lagging, resulting in tanks, vehicles, communications equipment, and a multitude of other 
items that simply do not work or easily break down.
181
 As mentioned, corrupt officials 
are not above selling spare parts and parts made with precious metals for a quick profit. 
Modern replacements are slow to arrive, assuming any are even planned. ―According to 
some reports [as of 2007], only about 10 to 20 percent of all weapons in the inventories 
[of the Russian armed forces, not just ground forces] are modern.‖
182
 Army-General 
Makarov stated that, ―Russia plans to modernize 30 percent of its weapon systems by 
2012, and 70 percent by 2020,‖ but the likelihood of achieving this goal is questionable. 
Funding for upgrading existing equipment and producing new weapons are in short 
supply.
183
 ―For example, between 2000 and 2004 the Russian army added only 15 new 
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tanks to its inventory of about 23,000.‖
184
 While the delivery of new equipment has 
improved since 2006, there is still little to show for it.
185
  
In 2008, 50 new T-90 tanks were delivered to two battalions.
186
 The T-90, the 
most modern tank in the RF‘s arsenal, has been in production since 1995 yet still only 
constitutes 1.5 percent of the total tank fleet.
187
 However, in reality the T-90 is nothing 
more than a modification of the Soviet T-72 tank which entered production in 1971 but 
costs 118 million rubles or $4 million per unit.
188
 Even the achievement of deploying new 
equipment, if only in limited numbers, is often tainted as well. During a session of the 
Defense and Security Committee of the upper house of the Russian parliament, Ground 
Forces Chief Colonel-General (three stars) Alexander Postnikov stated,  
The weapon models that are manufactured by our industry, including armor, 
artillery and small arms and light weapons, fail to meet the standards that exist in 




Specifically, he said that it would be easier to purchase three Leopards, Germany‘s main 
battle tank, for the cost a single T-90.
190
 The inability of the RF to provide its soldiers 
with the necessary equipment to allow them to perform their duties, or the funding 
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needed to maintain their current equipment does not instill confidence, or loyalty for that 
matter, in the average soldier‘s mind. 
 
Communications 
Communications was one issue that seriously impaired ground forces‘ ability to 
perform their duties during the Georgian conflict.  
Communication systems and electronic warfare assets employed by commanders 
and frontline forces were obsolete.…The 58th Army commander, Lieutenant-
General Anatoliy Khrulev, was reported to have communicated with his forces in 
the midst of combat via a satellite phone borrowed from a journalist, since 




The difficulty in communications prevented space-based and electronic intelligence from 




maritime and topographic maps provided conflicting data…[and]…[s]atellite-
targeting support to artillery was woefully absent, thereby prevented the use of 
precision-guided munitions and the accurate adjustment of artillery fire. 
 
The result was that ground troops were forced to use 1960s optical equipment to target 
conventional weapons systems.
193
 At the time of the conflict, the Russian Federation‘s 
independent global positioning system, GLONASS, was not yet operation due to a 
―subcritical number of satellites in orbit and the ground units lacked receivers‖
194
 which 
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Finally, it is also believed that the lack of inter-unit communications is what 
contributed to the high number of ―friendly-fire‖ incidents. Currently there is no 
interoperable communications system, unlike in most advanced militaries, which allows 
for integrated communications between ―tank, motorized-rifle, helicopter, attack-plane, 
and tactical-bombers units.‖
196
 This was a lesson learned by the United States during the 
invasion of Grenada in 1983 when marines on the island could not communicate with 
ships off the coast to call in air support. Yet there are still no plans to resolve this 
problem within the Russian military. Lack of even basic interoperable communications 
speaks poorly of the abilities of the Russian military. If the Georgian conflict had lasted 
longer than five days, casualties simply due to a lack of communication could have been 
substantially higher.   
 
Ground Forces‘ Performance in Georgia 
There were several other miscellaneous mistakes and failures as the Russian 
Army went into combat against Georgia in August of 2008, several of which will be 
explored below. First, the tanks and vehicles with which the Russian Army went into 
combat were in some cases useless. Russian soldier preferred to ride on their armored 
personnel carriers and tanks rather than in them because they ―could not resist anti-tank 
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rockets or mines or small caliber armour piercing ammunition.‖
197
 Also, the reactive 
armor canisters of 58th Army‘s T-72 tanks, those meant to ―deflect high-explosive anti-
tanks (HEAT) weapons‖ were empty.
198
 This rendered the reactive armor useless and 
anyone caught inside the tanks, should they be struck, dead.
199
 The 58th Army left 
numerous vehicles by the roadside on its drive into Georgia because many of them 
simply broke down.
200
 These breakdowns caused traffic jams that would have made easy 
targets had the Georgia Air Force been able to strafe them.
201
 Most of the 58th Army‘s 
tanks, ―60 to 75 percent…deployed to the theater of operation were older T-62 and T-
72Ms,‖
202
 tanks designed and built in the 1960s and 1970s. Even the modern T-72BM, 
introduced in 2006, ―could not withstand Georgian antitank warheads.‖
203
 In addition,  
[o]lder tanks not only lacked GPS but also thermal imagers and IFF systems. 
Moreover, the armored columns included BMP-1 and BMD-1 (infantry personnel 




Friendly fire incidents were not only due to communications equipment failure, 
but also due to the unprofessional nature of Russian troops, which were often not 
―equipped according to official regulations.‖
205
 Russian soldiers tend to choose  
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personal equipment themselves, with the result that Russian troops in Georgia 
looked more like partisans, which also accounted for why they were reduced to 
using armlets to identify themselves, and that it was possible to distinguish  




The lack of IFF systems in Russian vehicle and tanks increased the probability of 
friendly-fire incidents because their Georgian adversary was fielding Soviet-era vehicles 
similar or identical to what the Russians had deployed.
207
 Meanwhile, the absence of 
more advanced imaging equipment, such as thermal- and night-vision equipment 
amongst Russian troops allowed for Georgian forces to regain ground at night lost during 
the day which may have also prolonged the conflict and increased Russian casualties.
208
 
Based on the information above, one overarching conclusion can be reached about 
the status of the Russian ground forces: they are seriously unprepared. The Russian 
military is still organized and prepared to fight mass warfare as it did against Nazi 
Germany. Military forces today must be smaller, faster, and more sophisticated than in 
the past, yet the Russian ground forces continue to remain a pre-computer age fighting 
force ready to lead a mass charge.
209
 The pervasive culture of abuse and corruption, lack 
of accountability, appropriate funding and oversight, low morale, and Russian youths‘ 
desire to avoid service at all costs has created a largely inefficient ground force that will 
not be able to engage effectively in future conflicts. Russia‘s ―victory‖ against Georgia 
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had more to do with the relative size of the clashing militaries and Georgian military 
mistakes, than the superior ability of Russian conventional forces. Unless drastic and 
forceful military modernization and reform takes places, Russia‘s ground forces will fail 
in their responsibility to defend the Russian Federation. 
 
Air Force 
 The Russian Air Force (VVS) is not immune to the personnel and equipment 
problems faced by the ground forces. Just as with the ground forces equipment, the air 
force inventory is aging as replacements and appropriate funding for maintenance, 
repairs, and upgrades are few and far between. Most of the fighters and technology was 
also developed by the Soviet Union or is based on Soviet design. Lack of adequate 
preventative maintenance and training has led to increases in accidents and crashes as the 
VVS tries to fly aircraft beyond their service expiration dates.  
The last few years have seen a string of accidents that only emphasizes the 
deficiencies within the VVS. In March 2007 two MiG-29s collided which led to the 
replacement of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force;…in January 2008 a trainer aircraft, an 
L-39, was lost as well; in March of the same year an Su-25 exploded and a Su-27 crash 
landed; in October a MiG-29 broke down in mid-air; and finally in December another 
MiG-29 disintegrated.
210
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Following a Mig-29 crash in East Siberia last December, the Defense Ministry 
admitted for the first time that Russia‘s Mig-29 fleet was mostly outdated and not 




As many as 70 percent of the MiG-29s in service are too old to take to the skies and only 
―30% of the Mig-29s were allowed to resume flights after a month-long suspension.‖
213
 
A possible cause of the crash was corrosion on the tail unit which was discovered after an 
inspection of all aircraft of this type was performed.
214
 
 Meanwhile, the low number of training hours logged by pilots is becoming a 
major problem. As of 2007, the ―number of flight hours [was] far below standard levels: 
it ranges from 20 to 25 hours annually for fighter aviation to 60 hours annually for 
transport aviation.‖
215
 Also, better qualified pilots are given priority in flying time, 
leaving second- and third-class pilots barely able to maintain their qualifications, let 
alone advance to the next level. This is a disturbing trend in pilot training especially since 
―first-class pilots today represent 40 per cent of the total number of pilots in air 
regiments, and on average they are only a few years away from the retirement age for 
pilots of 45.‖
216
 During the Georgian conflict, five Russian aircraft were shot down 
during the first day: three Su-25 tactical bombers, one Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, 
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and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber
217
 ―proving that pilots could not perform even 
simple combat mission efficiently.‖
218
 Ironically, the pilots that  
took part in the air assault were most likely some of the most experienced Russian 
pilots, belonging to ground attack regiments with extensive experience from air 
operations in Chechnya.…The losses indicate that even within these units there 




Total Russian losses during the war may have exceeded 10 aircraft with at least another 




 The most glaring failure of the Russian Air Force during the Georgian conflict 
was its inability to establish air superiority throughout the entire conflict. The Georgian 
Air Force consisted of only a dozen Su-25 attack aircraft, yet was able to execute attack 
missions on Russian units until the last day of the conflict.
221
 The VVS also conducted 
―no suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations‖ which may have been a 




On the eve of the [Georgian] campaign the VVS had no around-the-clock SEAD 
capabilities, which meant Russia did not possess the option of mounting an air 
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campaign such as those executed by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War, 




Therefore, the VVS was unable to do in 2008 what was effectively demonstrated by the 
United States almost twenty years ago.  
The combat capabilities of helicopter units fared no better than that of fighter 
units during the Georgian conflict. This was demonstrated by the fact that ground units 
received little to no close air support during the conflict leaving them vulnerable to 
ambush.
224
 One possible reason for this was due to the shortage of forward air controllers 
in South Ossetia that would have been able to direct attack aircraft and helicopters and 




The VVS also chose, for whatever reason, to employ its precision-guided 
weapons sparingly. ―The Russian air force appears to…[lack] the training and weapon 
systems needed for high precision strikes in situations of low visibility.‖
226
 The current 
arsenal of the VVS precision-guided weapons have a range of 12 kilometers and required 
that pilots fly on a straight course before and after launch, exposing the aircraft to enemy 
air defense.
227
 Georgian meteorological conditions during the war consisted of  
recurrent cloudiness and a low cloud base, [which] restricted the use of laser and 
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Therefore, the VVS depended more on unguided bombs and air-to-surface rockets 
which lowered the accuracy of strikes and exposed fighter aircraft to increased risk as 
unguided weapons require shorter launch distances and therefore greater exposure to 
enemy air defense.
229
 This required more sorties to destroy a single target which also 
increased exposure to enemy fire.
230
 For this reason, it made sense for the VVS to employ 
strategic long-range bombers because they could drop unguided munitions from altitudes 
beyond what many air defense systems can reach.
231
 These vulnerabilities of the VVS  
underscored the fact that the Russian air force obviously lacked suitable standoff 
weapons. Cruise missiles with a conventional warhead have been part of the 
Russian air force inventory for some years, albeit in small numbers, and the Tu-
22M3 bombers can carry such weapons. However, there are no indications of air-
launched cruise missiles having been used in the Five-Day War, which puts the 
air force capability to precision strikes over longer distances into question.51 It also 
implies that Russia cannot conduct air strikes from a safe distance even in a local 
war close to its own borders; Russian pilots have to enter enemy air space when 
carrying out air raids and this exposes them to enemy fire. Moreover, the Russian 
air units were forced to carry out missions mainly in daylight, since many aircraft 
lacked night-vision equipment. This was not the case with the modernized 
Georgian Su-25 aircrafts, which were able to operate at night.52 Also, the Russian 
air force almost completely lacked the ability to wage electronic warfare, which 




Finally, the Russian bomber fleet, Tu-95 ―Bear‖ and Tu-160 ―Blackjack,‖ while 
primarily designed as strategic bomber vehicles, are also able to carry conventional 
munitions. Emphasis on these aircraft has increased as the Russian Federation has 
resumed long-range patrols under Vladimir Putin; however, they are also suffering from 















limited maintenance and there are currently no new replacement aircraft in production 
and the newest plan for a new strategic bomber has been put off. The Tu-95 in particular 
is a turboprop bomber based on 1950s technology. While the technology in both bombers 
has proven itself to be relatively reliable, these aircraft can only be flown so far past their 
service lifetimes.  
The Bears and Blackjacks also suffer from several unique characteristics that will 
only decrease their future reliability. First, the engines for both bombers are no longer in 
production and require extensive maintenance to ensure their continued function.
233
  
The service life of the Kuznetsov NK-32 turbofan engines (Tu-160) has now been 
extended to 21 years, and of the Kuznetsov NK-12MP turboprop engines (Tu-
95MS) to 24 years. Analysis of the repair contracts announced by the MoD 
[Ministry of Defense] suggests that the engines are a much bigger headache than 




Second, the integral tanks of both bombers (the internal tank that carries the bomber‘s 
fuel) have developed cracks that must either be repaired or replaced, and the corrosion or 
structural damage of the wings on the bombers have also become issues of concern.
235
 
Maintenance, repairs, and reinforcements will help to keep these aircraft in the air, but 
each additional service extension places their aircrews at increased risk. There have 
already been two major accidents, one in ―2002 [when] one of the engines of a Tu-95MS 
bomber belonging to the 184
th
 TBAP [caught] fire in mid-flight, but the crew managed to 
land the plane at its home airfield.‖
236
 Another accident in 2003 involving a Tu-160 made 
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in 1992 which crashed and killed its entire crew when the main integral tank 
disintegrated.
237
 The loss of even a single Tu-160 places an increased strain on this 
bomber fleet as there are only sixteen remaining in the Russian inventory. Meanwhile, 
there is more flexibility with the Tu-95s, of which there are approximately 60. 
Finally, the aircrews of long-range bombers are at particular risk due to the nature 
of their mission. Their long-range flights often take them far from Russian territory and 
eliminate any hope of successful search-and-rescue operation should an accident occur 
abroad. The loss of these aircraft and their crews will decrease Russian bomber 
capability. Aircrews of these bombers already complain about the lack of enough rescue 
suits available on each bomber.
238
 Even with enough rescue equipment on board, 
aircrews know that their chance of survival is almost zero.  
When Soviet planes (including Tu-95 and An-22 [strategic airlifter] aircraft) went 
down somewhere far out in the ocean, their crews were always lost. The latest 
incident involved a Tu-142MZ long-range anti-submarine aircraft of the Pacific 
Fleet Aviation, which was lost in the Tatar Strait in November 2009, only 20km 
away from the shore. None of its 11 crew members survived. The Tu-142MZ 
model has the same airframe and engines as the Tu-95MS bomber. Even if the 
crew (four people for Tu-160 and seven for Tu-95MS) survive the actual crash 
somewhere far in the Arctic, Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, they cannot expect swift 
rescue by the Russian Air Force or Navy. These services have never had the 




While there is no indication of overt dissent or demand for change in conditions among 
bomber aircrews, this is definitely a factor that the Russian leadership will have to take 











into account if they wish to continue flying the strategic bomber fleet with such 
frequency far from the Russian mainland. 
All these facts call attention to the precarious status that the Russian Air Force 
finds itself in. The Georgian conflict in particular drew attention to the VVS‘s inability to 
suppress or destroy Georgian air defenses;
240
 defeat the Georgian Air Force; or 
effectively defend their aircraft from attack. In addition, the VVS did not possess the 
ability to provide close combat support or communicate with its ground troops. Finally, 
the arsenal of the VVS prevented its pilots from effectively targeting enemy positions due 
to the vulnerability of employing guided munitions and the inefficiency of employing 
unguided munitions. The United Sates has demonstrated the superiority of air power on 
numerous occasions since 1991. Air power is often the key to victory in major conflicts 
and during the Georgian War the Russian military demonstrated that its air force 
possesses many weaknesses. The atrophy it suffered during the 1990s in terms of 
equipment degradation, pilot training, and development and deployment of new vehicles 
has severely limited the capability of this military branch. Without a major investment in 
procurement for aircraft, armaments, and training the VVS will continue to remain unable 
to fulfill its functions properly. 
 
Navy 
 The Russian Federation continues to maintain a naval presence even in the face of 
severe underfunding. In comparison to the ground forces and air force, the loss of funding 
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during the 1990s hurt the Russian Navy (VMF) the hardest due to the complex nature of 
the equipment, its sensitivity to degradation, and the longer time necessary to rehabilitate 
it.
241
 The neglect and disrepair of the 1990s allowed ―ships to rust and technical expertise, 
institutional knowledge and naval traditions to erode.‖
242
 Weak Russian shipbuilding 
capacity and delays in ship construction and funding have resulted in an increasingly 
aging Russian fleet in all classes and will make it time consuming to increase the VMF‘s 
numbers.
243
 The same as with air and ground forces, most of the equipment in the VMF‘s 
inventory was either built by the Soviet Union or is based on its design. It was only in 
2007 with the Steregushchiy-class corvette, that the very first Russian ship was 
commissioned that was designed and built from the ground up since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.
244
 Even so, the quality of new warships is in question due to the fact that 
―Russia‘s shipyards were not just quiet for a decade — they spiraled into decay.‖
245
  
The nature of Russian Navy‘s geographic areas of responsibility only makes it 
harder to fulfill its mission. Russia‘s naval forces are posted in five major regions: the 
Barents, the Baltic, the Black, and the Caspian Seas, and the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, 
with global warming, increased economic opportunities for resource exploitation, and 
corresponding competition in the Arctic, the Northern Fleet in the Barents may need to be 
                                                 
241



















expanded or a separate Arctic force may be under consideration. Each of these areas is 
important in its own way and geographically isolated from one another.
246
 Reinforcing 
one fleet with assets from another is extremely time consuming or impossible as in the 
case of the Caspian flotilla. The Black and Baltic Sea Fleets are boxed in as well since 
any ship would have to pass narrow choke points to reach their destinations. The Baltic 
Fleet would have to navigate around the islands of Denmark to access the Atlantic. 
Meanwhile, any ship in the Black Sea Fleet seeking to reach the Atlantic would have to 
navigate the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles, and later on the Straits of Gibraltar to 
exit the Mediterranean. All four of these pose navigational choke points limiting the 
movement of vessels in and out of these two seas that, in the event of a conflict, could be 
closed to Russian naval vessels.    
While the Russian Navy has undertaken some limited operations, it is difficult to 
gauge the effectiveness of Russian warships, submarines, and sailors. Participation in the 
UN sanctioned Somali anti-piracy operation
247
 and the Georgian conflict demonstrate that 
the Russian Navy is not totally crippled, however these naval operations tend to be the 
exception rather than the rule. In January of 2009, only five warships out of the entire 
Russian Fleet (not including auxiliaries) were deployed abroad.
248
 During the Georgian 
conflict, the VMF played a limited role seeing as Georgia possessed a limited naval 
presence and most of the fighting took place far from the Black Sea‘s coast. 
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One of the few specific indicators about the Russian Navy available is Russian 
shipbuilding capacity. While a few ships and submarines have been constructed or 
completed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian shipbuilding capability has 
severely diminished as highlighted by the recent decision by the Russian military to 
purchase four French designed Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.
249
 Two will be 
built on French territory and two on Russian with each consecutive ship being built 
increasingly using Russian labor.
250
 Ideally, this should allow for Russian workers to gain 
the necessary construction skills and abilities that can be later transferred to domestic 
warship construction. In addition, as proof that the Russian shipbuilding industry lacks 
the capability to produce such advanced warships is the announcement by the Russian 
government that a new shipyard will be constructed in St. Petersburg for the express 
purpose of constructing the latter two Mistrals.
251
  
Without further detailed evidence it is difficult to reach any specific conclusions 
concerning the effectiveness of the Russian Navy. However, it may be the lack of 
evidence that can provide a more general assessment of Russian naval capability. The 
few number of naval patrols conducted every year; the slow construction rates and 
additions of new warships to the Russian fleets; and the low budgetary priority of the 
VMF, especially during the 1990s, can lead one to assume that the capabilities of the 
Russian navy have severely atrophied and will take time to rebuild assuming proper 
funding allocation. 
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 Despite the benefits of nuclear weapons and even assuming that the Russian 
Federation was willing to broaden the conditions under which they would be employed, 
the priority of Russian military reform over the last decade has consistently focused on 
reform and modernization of its conventional military forces. Russia‘s leaders realize that 
nuclear weapons are currently limited to a few select and specific missions. Although 
these are very important missions, the chance of their use is very low in the current global 
environment. Russia‘s leaders realize that conventional forces provide a strong measure 
of flexible response. Therefore, while Russian reliance on nuclear weapons will increase 
as time goes by, this does not mean that Russia‘s leaders have decided to abandon 
conventional capability.  
 The Russian leadership has unveiled several reform programs over the years that 
have targeted all three conventional military branches. These reforms have called for 
major downsizing of military forces, elimination of conscription and professionalization 
of forces, and the introduction of modern weapons to reflect the changes in modern 
technology in the post-Cold War era. In a March 5, 2010 speech to the Defense Ministry 
Collegium, President Medvedev called for ―renewing arms and equipment at a rate of 9 
to 11 percent per year for the next decade, in order to reach a target of modernizing 70 
percent of the military equipment by 2020.‖
252
 The likelihood of achieving this goal will 
be difficult as the current rate of renewal is less than two percent and even the Soviet 
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Union averaged only a 5 to 7 percent rate during the 1980s.
253
 In order to achieve this 
goal, the Defense Ministry has put together a new modernization plan titled the State 
Armaments Program (SAP) 2020 which outlines procurement priorities for the next 
decade from 2011 through 2020. However, the SAP has not been publicly released (and 
probably will not be) and any information available is based on public statements or data 
leaked to the public. 
 
State Armaments Modernization Program 
The budget for this armaments program is listed as 20 trillion rubles ($650.56 
billion) and almost a quarter, 4.7 trillion rubles ($150.7 billion), is allocated for naval 
modernization.
254
 This modernization plan is ―three times more than is allocated in the 
existing 2007-2015 program.‖
255
 One third of the funding is expected to be provided by 
2015.
256
 Part of the reason for such a large budget is the Russian government‘s 
recognition of graft, corruption, and mismanagement within defense procurement. 
―Various press reports estimate that as much as half of all procurement money is spent on 
bribes and other forms of corruption.‖
257
 Therefore, it is necessary to provide more 
funding to overcome the money that ―disappears‖ due to these causes. The ability to fund 
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this program in its totality assumes that government revenues from oil, natural gas, and 
other natural resources will continue which is not guaranteed considering the volatility of 
these markets. Overall, SAP 2020 is a very ambitious armaments program and if 
successful would go a long way toward modernizing Russian forces and improving the 
technical quality of its military equipment. This is critically important due to the obsolete 
nature of much of the equipment, in many cases its poor quality, and use past official 
service life. 
All three conventional military branches are slated to receive new equipment. The 
Air Force is expected to be the main beneficiary of this new armaments program with the 
navy and ground forces considered lesser priorities.
258
  
The Ministry of Defense believes it can modernize all of the country‘s military 
aircraft over the next ten years. The goal is to purchase 350 new fighter airplanes, 
1,000 new helicopters, and a number of new transport aircraft. This is a high 





Specific air force procurement plans include the purchase of a total of 50 to 60 T-50 fifth-
generation fighter aircraft. This fighter aircraft is the Russian Federation‘s response to the 
United State‘s development of the F-22 Raptor, a next generation air superiority fighter. 
In addition, the VVS would procure 
 Su-35BM fourth-generation fighter aircraft. Forty-eight to be purchased in 
2010-2015.  
 Su-34 fighter-bomber. Thirty-two to be purchased in 2010-2015.  
 MiG-35 fighter. Currently in development. First units expected to enter the air 
force in 2013.  
 Yak-130 training aircraft. One hundred fifty to be delivered in 2010-2015. An 
additional fifty to be procured in 2016-2020.  
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 An-124 transport aircraft. Twenty to be purchased in 2015-2020. Ten to be 
modernized in 2011-2020.  
 An-70 transport aircraft. Sixty to be purchased in 2011-2020.  





Russian air defenses are also expected to receive new equipment with the purchase of 
additional S-400 air defense systems. ―The goal is to have as many as 23 regiments (of 8 
to 12 missiles each) by 2015.‖
261
 The S-400 will be supported with S-500 systems 
currently under development and expected to be ready for production by 2013. 
Both the S-400 and S-500 systems are superior to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 in 




 Meanwhile, at least officially, the Russian Navy is expected to see a vast increase 
in the number of new ships in its fleet. This includes the beefing up of Russian 
conventional submarine capability to include two to five new Yasen-class multi-purpose 
attack submarines, two to seven Lada-class diesel submarines, and potentially several 
additional Kilo-class submarines.
263
 The number of surface combat ships the Russian 
military intends to add to its fleet is extremely ambitious. No less than 30 new ships that 
include destroyers, corvettes, landing craft, aircraft carriers, the Mistral-class helicopter 
assault ship, and two classes of frigates.
264
 Besides these new construction projects, the 
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 Much less is known regarding modernization plans for the ground forces under 
the SAP, however, it is expected to receive the least amount of funding. It is known that 
―the military has canceled plans to procure the T-95 battle tank and will instead continue 
to purchase T-90 tanks for the foreseeable future.‖
266
 Some other additional equipment 
may be purchased but what kind and how much is unclear. However,  
the Russian military will focus on improving its communications 
capabilities by upgrading its GLONASS satellite system and procuring 
new digital communications and command and control systems, as well as 
other high-tech items such as night vision equipment and better IFF 
(Identify Friend or Foe) systems. Many of these items are likely to be 




The decision to invest in this kind of equipment can be clearly traced back to the 
problems faced by Russian ground forces during the Georgian campaign and can be seen 
as a reflection of lessons learned. 
 Nuclear forces have not been ignored by the SAP modernization program and 
there are several new acquisitions expected to occur along with conventional 
procurement. First, the navy is expected to construct a total of eight Borey-class SSBNs 
by 2015.
268
 The Yuri Dolgoruky, the first Borey of in this class, is already completed and 















undergoing sea trials and another three are in various stages of construction.
269
 However, 
the continued problems with the Bulava SLBM may delay further construction of the 
Borey since it was designed specifically to accommodate it. While the Bulava may seem 
too big to fail, if further testing of the missile continues to leave the Navy uncertain about 
its reliability, then further Borey construction may have to be halted. In essence, the 
Borey and Bulava are a package deal and the Navy will not accept one without the other. 
 The SAP did include a provision for a next-generation long-range bomber, but on 
February 24, 2011, First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin, head of 
procurement, announced that it would push back the development of a new bomber to a 
later date and continue to depend on the Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks. The Bears 
and Blackjacks are expected to remain in service until 2030. As a concession for delaying 
a new bomber, the current Bear and Blackjack fleet is expected to be refit and 
modernized with new avionics and equipment.
270
 Finally, the Strategic Missile Forces 
will continue along their current modernization program which includes the continued 
retirement of SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and their replacement with new Topol-M (SS-27s) 
and RS-24 Yars ICBMs.
271
 
Despite these grand modernization goals, it should be noted that this procurement 
plan targets only the equipment and not the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who will be 
operating it. There is currently no known comprehensive training and education plan 
outlined for Russian military personnel and equipment is only as good as those who 
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operate it. Even the most advanced weaponry can be ineffective or useless if soldiers or 
sailors are insufficiently educated and trained on how to use it properly, and integrate it 
with other systems and other military branches. Therefore, even if the Russian military is 
able to reach its goal of 70% modern equipment by 2020 it does not mean that the 
equipment will be employed to its fullest potential. This will be a major problem as 
sufficient training funds are still difficult to obtain and conscripts will have a year or less 
in which to train on their equipment. Also, the quality of education that conscripts enter 
with has been steadily decreasing while the technical know-how necessary to operate new 
equipment has been on the rise.  
As the SAP will not be released to the public, it is difficult to know how accurate 
the procurement and construction objectives listed above are. The types of vehicles and 
numbers listed above are not complete and may be subject to change. In addition, the 
goals outlined in the SAP are very ambitious and should not be taken at face value. One 
can assume that there may be a classified, more conservative, SAP internal document that 
reflects more achievable, realistic, and sustainable goals.  
The likely existence of such a document is best highlighted by the goals for naval 
modernization. These goals in particular appear to be wildly optimistic about Russian 
construction capabilities considering the current status and slow pace of the shipbuilding 
industry in Russia. As stated, warships are complex, expensive, time consuming 
construction projects and this is compounded by the fact that the Russian shipbuilding 
industry suffers from graft, corruption, a lack of skilled workmen, weak shipyard 
infrastructure, and requires long construction rates.  
95 
The idea that the Russian shipbuilding industry could produce ten Admiral 
Gorshkov-class frigates, several Krivak IV-frigates, ten Steregushchii-class corvettes, and 
another five to ten destroyers all by 2020 is highly doubtful. This does not even include 
the official SAP‘s reference to the construction of at least three aircraft carriers, although 
a specific time table is no included for their commissioning. If these goals are even half 
true, then they assume a substantial improvement in Russian warship construction 
capabilities that at this time do not appear to exist. Either these stated goals are purely for 
domestic and foreign propaganda purposes and the Russian leadership has a more 
realistic outlook on its abilities, or they assume they can overcome these shortcomings 
with enough political pressure and money. The only other explanation is that Russia‘s 
leaders fail to grasp the reality of the obstacles facing the military industry which is 
difficult to believe with both the Borey and Bulava standing out as prime examples of the 
industry‘s weaknesses.   
Regardless of whether or not one assumes that the procurement goals in the SAP 
are real, there will still be a corresponding increase in reliance on nuclear weapons. If the 
goals are real and achieved by 2020, questions regarding the quality and capabilities of 
the equipment and appropriate training will still remain as major issues. If the goals are 
not real or fail to be achieved by 2020 then there will continue to remain a shortage of 
new equipment and Russian conventional forces will be forced to continue to operate 
equipment that is obsolete, poorly maintained, and subject to failure. In either case, 
nuclear weapons provide the necessarily support and backup to the conventional forces to 
make up the difference where conventional forces fall short. 
 
96 
Issues with the Domestic Defense Industry 
 The Russian government has finally decided to take a firm stand with the defense 
establishment and begun to intervene more readily in their operations in an attempt to 
improve their performance after years of poor results. In response to corruption, 
incompetence and shoddy workmanship, especially in naval construction, the Kremlin 
has started firing people.
272
 In addition, the Russian government  
has begun reorganizing entire sectors of the defense industry under unified 
aegises, such as the United Aircraft Building Corp. and the United Shipbuilding 





 The Russian government has clearly outlined a very ambitious procurement and 
modernization plan and if even half of items in this document are realized it will 
represent a significant improvement of the Russian military, at least in respect to the 
relative quality of equipment compared to what they operate now. However, the Defense 
Ministry has proposed ambitious targets in the past and failed to reach them due to 
bureaucratic inertia, corruption, political in-fighting, and lack of funding. An 
announcement by the Audit Chamber stated that ―one billion rubles of military 
procurement money was lost to corruption in 2009.‖
274
 The ambitious attempt to 
professionalize the ground forces is another example that fell flat and is considered all but 
a failure. 
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Even assuming that the planned modernization was successful in reaching its 
target numbers for deployment of new vehicles and equipment, the quality of the 
equipment is also in question. Discounting the kinds of production failures characterized 
by the Bulava missile, quality and capability of the new ―modern‖ Russian equipment in 
comparison to Western weapons will be a major concern. The Russian defense 
establishment all but collapsed following the break-up of the Soviet Union when defense 
orders dried up. Defense industry production equipment and manpower has severely 
atrophied over the last 20 years.  
The best workers – those left over from Soviet times when the industry was well 
funded and a highly prestigious sector in which to works – have retired or are 
about to do so. Few good people went into the field in the 1990s, when there was 




Those that the defense industry would like to recruit have all pursued more successful, 
higher paying positions in the private sector or abroad. This left the defense establishment 
unable to recruit the next generation of specialists, leaving it unprepared to meet the 
demand to produce the kinds of sophisticated and advanced types of weapons and 
technology needed for the next generation of warfare.  
At the same time, because there was no money for equipment modernization, the 
industrial plant[s] began to deteriorate. By the start of the Putin presidency, even 
the allocation of additional financing was not enough to counteract the decline in 
the defense industry‘s ability to produce high quality products. This decline will 





This is most likely the primary reason that the Russian government has turned to 
purchasing advanced weapons systems like the Mistral and UAVs abroad. Purchasing 
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weapons systems abroad will help Russia overcome many of the problems associated 
with its attempts at defense modernization. Purchasing weapons designed and built by 
foreign defense contractors allows the Russian government to save massive amounts of 
time and money that would have been spent on domestic research and development, 
testing, and production. All that needs to be provided is the funding and the Russian 
military receives reliable, high-quality, high-tech weapons much faster than if they were 
produced domestically. In some cases, as with the Mistral, the Russian government will 
also be permitted to purchase the license to some of the weapons systems it acquires, 
allowing it to legally reverse engineer the technology and produce it domestically.  
However, the Russian government realizes that each weapon procured abroad is at 
the expense of the domestic defense establishment.  Also, there is a limit to just how 
advanced the technology it purchases will be, which leaves it no choice but to try and 
develop the technology and weapons platforms domestically. This brings Russia back to 
the current obstacles it faces in developing and deploying weapons and technology of 
sufficient capability, quality, quantity, and reliability amongst the conventional forces to 
ensure their ability to confront another conventionally armed foe. If they are unable to do 
so currently and in the near future, then once again, nuclear weapons provide an effective 
means of overcoming the conventional weakness. This is not to say that the SAP 2020 
will fail but past attempts at reform have failed, examples like the Bulava demonstrate 
Russian difficulty with developing certain advanced weapons, and the problems posed by 
corruption are unlikely to go away any time soon. Therefore, the Russian ability to 
produce and deploy the necessary conventional equipment may take longer than the 2020 
benchmark, leaving nuclear weapons as Russia‘s only defense guarantee. 
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Making Up the Short Fall  
 The multitude of examples listed above demonstrates that each branch of Russia‘s 
conventional forces carries with it serious deficiencies. Obsolete technology, slow 
production and under-deployment of modern equipment, and undertrained soldiers and 
sailors cannot be overcome quickly or cheaply. As equipment and personnel continue to 
deteriorate, the effectiveness of Russia‘s conventional forces will increasingly be called 
into question by other nations, Russia‘s allies, and Russia‘s own public. The domestic 
defense industry‘s current inability to produce the quality of weapons needed for the 21st 
century is also a major concern for a military still configured for mass warfare. The 
observed and demonstrated weaknesses and failures of Russia‘s conventional forces in 
the Georgian War only reinforce the importance that nuclear weapons will play into 
Russian defense planning.  
Although the Strategic Missile Forces and other two legs of the nuclear triad 
require modernization and upgrades as well, they constitute a much smaller overall 
percentage of the Russian military. A smaller investment in the nuclear triad yields a 
much more significant advantage in terms of deterrence, retaliation, and destructive 
capability. So long as modern nuclear weapons continue to exist in Russia‘s arsenal, and 
reliable delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons are available, then the failures and 
deficiencies of conventional forces can be offset. The next section will explore the 




CHAPTER SEVEN: RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR TRIAD 
 
 Russian nuclear forces have fared better than conventional forces since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. One reason for this was political, as the Defense Minister 
appointed by Yeltsin in 1997, Igor Sergeyev, was a former commander of the Strategic 
Missile Forces (SMF). Therefore, his favoritism toward his former branch colored his 
perception of Russia‘s military priorities resulting is larger amounts of funding being 
allocated to maintaining and modernizing Russia‘s nuclear forces. Another factor that 
contributed to the improved state of the SMF was the fact that they constituted a much 
smaller force in comparison to the other branches and a smaller percentage of defense 
spending had a more significant impact. As of 2000, defense spending on strategic forces 
only constituted 13 percent of the overall defense budget.
277
 In addition, planned 
reductions of nuclear weapons and forces under the START treaties allow for more 
funding to maintain fewer weapons and personnel. Finally, with the general perception by 
government and military officials within the country that Russia is militarily weak, 
nuclear weapons provided the kind of guarantee that would deter any would-be 
adversary. Therefore, there is a need to maintain the one weapon in Russia‘s arsenal that 
was a sure means of defending the state. 
 Nuclear weapons possessed other qualities that made them appealing to Russia‘s 
leaders, at least temporarily as a ―stop-gap‖ measure until the state was able to recover 
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and return investment to conventional forces. For all the destructive potential contained 
in even one nuclear weapon, they are relatively cheap, reliable, exist in mass quantities, 
possess multiple redundancies through air, sea, and land based delivery vehicles, 
represent a capability that can only be matched by a handful of other nations, and their 
SLBMs and ICBMs can strike a target anywhere in the world in less than an hour of the 
order to launch being given. No other weapon in the Russian arsenal can respond as 
quickly with such destructive power. Moreover, with proper maintenance, nuclear 
weapons have service lives of decades. The weapons themselves do not have morale, 
require salaries or benefits, and cannot mutiny. Attempting to construct a commensurate 
conventional force with equally destructive power and global reach would be heinously 
expensive and far beyond Russia‘s current financial and technical capability.  
In other words, nuclear weapons were viewed as [a] cost-effective alternative to 
more expensive and time-consuming conventional modernization. They were also 





For the Russian leadership, the benefits boiled down to the fact that nuclear weapons 
allowed them to do more with less and this is still true today. 
 Finally, beyond their obvious military benefits, nuclear weapons imbue the 
Russian Federation with Great Power status in global affairs. Any country can have a 
large conventional military, but nuclear weapons allow the Russian Federation to stand 
apart with a select number of states with literally the power to destroy the world. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, major losses of territory and severe cuts to its military, the 
Russian Federation was not about to give up such a major status symbol. In fact, nuclear 
weapons remain Russia‘s only remaining claim to superpower status other than its natural 
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resources and geographic size. They also allow Russia to remain relevant in international 
affairs by using their nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip and allow them a surefire 
means of maintaining the attention of other powers and preventing themselves from being 
marginalized in the post-Cold War era. This remains as true in 2011 as it did in 1991. 
 The benefits of nuclear weapons and the deficiencies of Russia‘s conventional 
forces outlined above represent a great part of why the Russian Federation will continue 
to rely on nuclear weapons in the future. However, that is not to say that Russia‘s nuclear 
weapons do not hold their own problems and inherent inefficiencies. The first and most 
obvious of which is that barring a global war, a direct threat to the survival of the Russian 
Federation, or the employment of weapons of mass destruction against Russian forces or 
territory, that nuclear weapons are overkill. Russia has become deeply integrated into the 
global economy and international affairs. As a result, its leaders must take into account 
how their actions and policies will be perceived by allies, trading partners, and other 
states and their potential response(s). Russia also views itself as a Great Power with a 
corresponding international responsibility signified by its status as a member of the 
United Nations Security Council and a nuclear power. Even the use of nuclear weapons 
in Russia‘s ―near abroad‖ would be counterproductive. 
Leaving aside any moral and ethical aspects of a nuclear strike against Ukraine or 
the other neighboring republics (that have, incidentally, 25 million ethnic 
Russians on their territories), from a purely military point of view a nuclear option 
would be absurd. These states would not under any circumstances be capable of 
mobilizing victorious offensive conventional operations against Russia, that might 
justify nuclear a response. On the other hand, if Russia attacks them with 
conventional forces, it would be senseless to use nuclear weapons against the 
territory and population, which Russia hypothetically might want to occupy. In 
103 
most cases if military conflict occurs Moscow may face only guerrilla-type 




Therefore, Russia realizes that it must proceed with caution when undertaking certain 
actions. Employing nuclear weapons or the threat to use them in most cases will be a 
disproportionate use of force and will quickly isolate the Russian Federation and 
potentially discredit it.  
 For these reasons, starting with the presidency of Vladimir Putin, there has been a 
strong emphasis on trying to reform and modernize Russia‘s conventional forces because 
the leadership realized that nuclear weapons are essentially useless in local or regional 
conflicts such as Chechnya or against Georgia. They also realized that the prevalence of 
these conflicts is likely to increase over time. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, 
the United States has demonstrated the effectiveness of conventional forces in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Kosovo with the development of new technologies such as UAVs and 
precision-guided munitions. These weapons have provided the United States with 
numerous conventional alternatives that have allowed it to wage war across vast distances 
and defeat heavily armed foes much quicker than previously believed possible. Especially 
with the rising threat from insurgent and terrorist groups in Russia and along its 
periphery, nuclear weapons do not represent a realistically viable weapon, at least not 
without significant political and economic repercussions. However, while the useful 
scope within which the use of nuclear weapons are acceptable is very narrow (i.e. 
survival of the Russian state/global war), it should also be remembered that those are the 
conditions under which nuclear weapons are the most necessary and effective. 
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 The second major issue regarding Russia's nuclear weapons is that, like the three 
conventional military forces, Russia‘s nuclear forces are plagued by aging equipment and 
a slow rate of modernization. The Strategic Missile Forces are probably in the best shape 
in regards to the modernization of it arsenal simply due to their smaller size. Yet, as of 
2006,  
[o]ver 80 percent of Russia‘s silo-based ICBMS have exceeded their original 
service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by 




The Russian military has been forced to extend the service life of Russia‘s aging ICBMs 
while they decommission older models and replace them with new variants, however 
extensions cannot continue indefinitely.
281
 Older missiles are already being 
decommissioning faster than they can be replaced.
282
  
The vast majority of Russia‘s land-based deliverable warheads are carried on 
older SS-18 ―Satan‖ and SS-19 ―Stiletto‖ missiles — all of which (save a reserve 
force of about 30 SS-19s) have already undergone sustainment programs to 




In addition, as of January 2011 the Russian Defense Ministry appears to be intent 
to developing a new generation of heavy ICBM to ensure that they are armed with the 
newest nuclear weapons and avoid the need for repeated service extensions. Production 
rates for new missiles are still slow, less than a dozen each year, due to limited financing 
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Figure 3. Image in ―Russia: Sustaining the Strategic Deterrent,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, December 
11, 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia_sustaining_strategic_deterrent. 
 
 
and long lead times necessary for design, testing, and approval.
284
 However, Prime 
Minister Putin announced in March 2011 that Russia would double ballistic missile 
production starting in 2013.
285
 Therefore, the Defense Ministry‘s early action may be an 
attempt to get a head start on overcoming these obstacles especially when official 
statements maintain that many of the oldest missiles may remain in the arsenal until 2030 
with current service extensions. 
 
Sea Leg 
 Meanwhile, Russia‘s nuclear ballistic submarines and SLBMs represent the 
weakest leg of the nuclear triad. ―At its peak, the Soviet navy operated more than 60 
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SSBNs. The fleet is now one-quarter that size, and most of the boats are in poor 
condition.‖
286
 Russia‘s strategic submarine fleet has also performed fewer deterrent 
patrols each year with only five in 2006 and three in 2007.
287
  
In comparison, the U.S. Navy conducts 50 or more such patrols annually. In the 
late 1980s, the Soviets conducted even more. This reversal of a slow climb from 
zero patrols in 2002 highlights the trouble Russia is still having with the sea-based 




It also reflects poorly on the quality of training that submarine crews have on ballistic 
missile submarines. 
The symbol of Russian naval weakness is the Bulava SLBM. It is Russia‘s first 
attempt to develop a solid-fuel SLBM and has been continuously plagued by test failures. 
The Bulava has been in development and testing for over a decade yet is still not ready 
for deployment. Since 2005, there have been fourteen test launches of the Bulava, yet 
more than half have been considered failures either because of partial or total failure of 
the missile.
289
 The deployment date for the Bulava has been consistently pushed back, 
most recently to the start of 2012, which has called into question the future of Russia‘s 
naval deterrent. Furthermore, due to its size, the Bulava can only be carried by the new 
Borey-class submarine which was redesigned to solely to carry the Bulava. 
Along with the Bulava, the Borey-class submarine, which will carry the Bulava, 
has suffered from its own setbacks. The first Borey was laid down in 1996, and as of 
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2011, although commissioned, has not yet finished sea trials and a firm date for its 
deployment is contingent on the acceptance of the Bulava by the Navy. The Borey and 
the Bulava together represent the next generation of Russia‘s nuclear naval triad. Due to 
the fact that both systems have been designed for each other, the importance of each 
project is magnified. There are currently no other SSBNs or SLBMs in development. 
Both projects must be successful if the Russian Federation hopes to maintain a viable sea 
leg deterrent. 
The delays and technical difficulties surrounding both of these projects require 
some context. Initial delays in completing the Borey were due to neglect and lack of 
funding during the 1990s.
290
 Later it was necessary to conduct extensive modification of 
the Borey to accommodate the Bulava SLBM design.
291
 As for the Bulava, the failures in 
production and testing have more to do with quality control of components than a 
problem with design. It should be noted that this is the first attempt by the Moscow 
Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), the company responsible for the design and 
production of the Bulava, to produce an SLBM. MITT is previously responsible for the 
successful design of the ground based Topol (NATO reporting code SS-25 ―Sickle‖), 
Topol-M (NATO reporting code SS-27 ―Sickle B‖), and RS-24 Yars ICBMs. 
 The inability of the Russian military to get both the Borey and the Bulava into 
production and deployment represents a major security risk due to the importance that 
SSBNs play in any country‘s nuclear triad. SSBNs with their SLBM arsenals can act as 
both first-strike or second-strike platforms. Their role as second-strike is much more 
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important because it is difficult to locate and destroy SSBNs hidden beneath the ocean‘s 
surface that are constantly on the move. Also, their SLBMs can ―be fired from various 
points of the compass and [have] the speed of ballistic missiles, not bombers.‖
292
 
Therefore, in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation that eliminates its ground 
based ICBMs and strategic air force, Russia could retaliate with SLBM launches. If 
Russia is unable to get the Borey and Bulava into deployment, it will undermine this 
second-strike capability and leave Russia vulnerable. Getting both of these systems into 
deployment is imperative as the strategic fleet is expected to carry at least 30 percent of 





Finally, Russia‘s strategic bomber fleet represents the last leg of its nuclear triad, 
and despite the deficiencies and age of the Tu-95s and Tu-160s mentioned above, it has 
proven itself to be reliable, especially in comparison to the naval leg. It is probably the 
most well trained of the triad flying ―more than 100 strategic bomber patrols over 
Russia's eastern, western and northern periphery in 2006,‖ which also included mid-air 
refueling.
294
 However, in relation to the Russia‘s ICBMs and SLBMs it is much weaker 
because its payload takes longer to deliver either as gravity bombs or as air launched 
cruise missiles and they are only able to carry missiles with a single warhead. Bombers 
are also more vulnerable to interception by enemy air forces and air defenses and they are 
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currently located at only a few air bases making their locations predictable and therefore 
vulnerable to preemptive strike.  
The greatest weakness of the current bomber fleet is obviously its deterioration 
due to age and lack of proper maintenance. Unless the Russian government invests 
heavily in repairs or replacement of the current bomber fleet, it may lose this leg of the 
triad simply due to the age of the equipment. Unfortunately, there are currently no new 
strategic bombers (either of current of new design) scheduled to enter into service any 
time soon. A next-generation strategic bomber was included in the new State Armaments 
Program but has since been pushed back. Currently only a preliminary sketch is expected 
around 2015. There is talk of restarting production of the Tu-160; however, this plan is 
uncertain ―as it took three years for the Kazan airplant to assemble the bomber that was 
added to the fleet in April 2008.‖
295
 Some might argue that the elimination of the 
strategic bomber fleet could be a positive outcome due to its lesser capability in 
comparison to SLBMs/ICBMs and as a cost saving measure. However, the fact remains 
that in repeated tests and training exercises the strategic bombers have performed 
successfully. Moreover, the long-range bombers possess a high demonstration value with 
their periodic flights in the North Atlantic and Pacific airspace.
296
 It would be difficult to 
justify their elimination as a cost-saving measure especially in the face of the current 
weaknesses displayed by the naval triad and its questionable future.  
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Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
 The difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons has not been 
emphasized here because the Russian Federation is likely to rely on both types of 
weapons simultaneously. However, the significance of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) 
will be mentioned here as it relates to Russia‘s nuclear dependence. Russia‘s TNWs 
primarily consist of short-range nuclear weapons that could be used it a conflict in 
Russia‘s ―near abroad‖ or along the RF‘s periphery. It is likely that the military exercises 
Zapad-99 and Stability 2008 that escalated into nuclear conflicts both employed TNWs. 
Because of their range limitations they are not considered strategic (i.e. able to strike the 
United States) and therefore are not bound by the nuclear weapons reduction and 
limitation treaties such as New START. In addition to short-range missiles, Russia‘s 
stockpile of TNWs also consists of nuclear landmines and artillery shells.
297
 The United 
States has sought to engage the RF on TNWs and negotiate a weapons reduction treaty 
similar to New START; however, the Russian Federation has thus far refused.
298
  
Russia‘s refusal to do so is greatly due to the fact that it holds a significant 
numerical advantage against the United States in TNWs. Meanwhile, the United States 
holds the advantage is strategic weapons. TNWs fit perfectly into Russia‘s current mind-
set and threat perception regarding external threats and the fear of invasion. Should an 
attack come along any front of the RF, then TNWs are suited to deterring or defeating 
that foe. Nuclear landmines could be laid in the path of invading forces to deter or 
destroy their advance, and short-range TNWs could target enemy forces massed along 
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Russia‘s border. This would make any adversary wary of employing ground troops 
against the RF and if their goal was to acquire territory then the fear would be that they 
could accidentally trigger such a weapon and contaminate the region.  
The fact that TNWs are not covered by any treaty provides Russia with a 
substantial advantage. First, it places no limits on Russia‘s ability to produce these types 
of weapons and have them labeled as ―tactical.‖ Even though they may be limited in 
range they could still be delivered against a far-off target if they could be staged close 
enough, such as on the territory of a Russian ally (like during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
1962). They could also be delivered by an alternative platform. A strategic bomber or 
submarine that gets close enough could be armed with such weapons. Second, if the RF 
were to employ TNWs in a conflict, then it would be able to conserve the number of 
strategic weapons it maintains to deter the United States or other nuclear powers. (The 
ability to conserve these weapons is pertinent due to the current slow rate of production 
for nuclear weapons in Russia.) This will become especially relevant as the number of 
strategic nuclear weapons on both sides continues to decrease as prescribed by current 
treaties. Therefore, as Russia‘s strategic nuclear deterrent decreases, it will be able to 
compensate with a robust stockpile of TNWs.  
Finally, TNWs provide Russia a solution to its concern that it may be approaching 
a threshold it cannot go below regarding how many strategic nuclear weapons it can 
maintain without compromising its ability to penetrate an anti-ballistic missile shield. So 
long as Russia refuses to reduce its TNWs, it can always augment its nuclear forces, such 
as its strategic bombers, with weapons that officially would be designated as ―tactical.‖ 
While there would be some sacrificed in capability, it is a potential loophole that the RF 
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could still exploit. Also, by decreasing its strategic nuclear weapons, Russia may weaken 
its ability to successful target and deter the United States; retaliate against the United 
States following a first strike (which would primarily target Russia‘s strategic weapons to 
protect the U.S. homeland and leave Russia‘s TNWs in better shape); or penetrate an 
anti-ballistic missile system.  
However, TNWs would allow Russia to retaliate against the United States 
indirectly. There are numerous U.S. military installations around the globe within range 
of Russia‘s TNWs that could be threatened. More importantly, Russia‘s TNWs could be 
employed against the U.S.‘s European allies (which also maintain U.S. bases and 
personnel) as retaliation or to hold them hostage to deter U.S. action. Therefore, even if 
the United States could protect itself with an effective anti-ballistic missile shield from 
Russia retaliation, it would have to be willing to risk sacrificing its allies and U.S. 
personnel abroad. Even if NATO countries had an effective anti-ballistic missile system, 
it could be overwhelmed using Russia‘s arsenal of TNWs. Therefore, Russia may come 
to rely more on its tactical nuclear weapons for its national security to compensate for 
reductions in its strategic stockpile. Regardless of whether they are strategic or tactical, 
Russia‘s reliance on nuclear weapons will persist. 
 
Nuclear Counterarguments  
 The strongest counterargument that can be proposed to this thesis is that a state 
cannot be wholly reliant on nuclear weapons. A state‘s willingness to use (or threaten to 
use) nuclear weapons loosely would be counterproductive due to the weapon‘s inability 
to distinguish between civilian and military targets, the wide destruction wrought by even 
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a single detonation, and the radiological aftereffects to the target environment. Nuclear 
weapons also run up against a fundamental issue with their practical application to certain 
scenarios such as terrorism and weapons proliferation.  
Therefore, conventional forces provide states with a much more measured, 
effective, and flexible response with significantly reduced political and economic fallout 
versus retaliating with a nuclear weapon. There is no denying this. However, it is 
necessary to take into account Russian threat perceptions and the facts on the ground 
surrounding Russian current and future military prospects. Russia‘s leaders have a history 
of outside invasion, a Cold War history in which they spent forty years under constant 
hair-trigger alert of nuclear war, and had the power of its military forces severely 
diminished following the breakup of the Soviet Union.  
Meanwhile, the Russian government has thus far been unable to institute broad 
and effective military reform and modernization, and the defense industry is still unable 
to produce the kinds of weapon and technology that has been demonstrated by its rivals 
and will be necessary if it intends to remain a relevant military power in the 21st Century. 
The Russian government is charged with defending the largest state in the world with 
tens of thousands of miles of border and coastline from a variety of threats spread out 
along its periphery with scarce military resources. And these military resources are not 
expected to substantially improve either in quantity or quality over time. This is 
especially true regarding military manpower as population decline due to numerous 
reasons reduces the number of eligible applicants for military service. If the trend in 
military decline continues then the only option left available to Russia‘s leadership will 
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be a reliance on nuclear weapons and the potential to reevaluate and broaden the scope in 
which their use is acceptable.  
 
Nuclear Consequences 
 Although the use of nuclear weapons in anger has not occurred since Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is not beyond the realm of 
imagination. While, their use against another nuclear power is extremely unlikely due to 
the consequences of a retaliatory strike, their use domestically, against a non-nuclear 
threat (state or non-state actor), or use in a demonstration detonation are possible. 
Conventional wisdom would argue that the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, either 
domestically or on foreign soil, against a non-nuclear threat would have political, 
economic, and international ramifications greater than any benefit that the use of nuclear 
weapons might yield. In most cases this would be true; however, Russia holds a unique 
position in global affairs and possesses several characteristics that may insulate or 
mitigate it from these consequences if it were to employ its nuclear weapons. 
 First, Russia‘s energy reserves and its role as a major energy exporter provide it 
with substantial leverage over the global energy market. All of Europe is dependent on 
Russian oil and natural gas either directly or indirectly which would make it impossible 
for European states to sanction and isolate Russia because they would be crippling their 
own economies at the same time (See Figure 4). The Baltic States in particular are at 
Russia‘s mercy when it comes to energy.  
Russia provides the entirety of the Baltic countries‘ natural gas supplies, 
which are exported via the Yamal pipeline system. Russia provides 99 percent of 
crude oil to Lithuania, the only Baltic country with a refinery. Russia also 
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provides 46 percent of Lithuania‘s refined oil products imports, as well as 23 
percent and 11 percent of total supplies to Estonia and Latvia, respectively… 
As for electricity, Estonia and Latvia are net exporters. Lithuania, 




Meanwhile, with the completion of the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea, Russia 
will soon provide energy directly to Germany, the largest economy in all of Europe and a 
major power player in the European community. Turkey is also heavily dependent on 
Russian natural gas through the Blue Stream pipeline and countries such as the Baltic 
states and other Eastern and Central European states are heavily dependent on Russian 
energy supplies. Meanwhile, Russia can retaliate against sanctions by disrupting pipelines 
and transportation routes along its periphery such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-
Supsa, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines that passes through the Caucasus‘s.  
Even assuming that the European economies were willing to undertake such 
economically crippling action and they could find alternative sources of oil and natural 
gas, it would have the consequence of driving up the global price of oil and gas further 
hurting the economies of Europe. Beyond energy exports, Russia is a major trading 
partner and market for numerous European states and any sanction or embargo against 
doing business with the Russian Federation would also be damaging to the European 
economy. Therefore, it would be very difficult for European countries to undertake 
sustained and sever enough action(s) to punish the Russian Federation for its use of 
nuclear weapons without damaging consequences to themselves. 
 Second, the Russian Federation‘s position as member of the UN Security Council 
would allow it to block and veto any sanctions or resolutions directed against it. Third, 
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the West, and the United States in particular, is involved in many international pursuits 
and endeavors almost all of which require Russia as an active participant, or least as a 
neutral party. U.S. desire to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, resolve the issues over Iran‘s 
and North Korea‘s nuclear programs, enforce non-proliferation and arms control policies, 
and combat international terrorism – among other things – all require Russian 
participation or support. If the United States were to level sanctions or condemnation 
against the Russia Federation or even break off relation as punishment, then the Russia 
Federation could be a serious agitator and disruptor of U.S. objectives abroad. The 
Russian Federation could even withdrawal from certain key treaties related to arms 
reduction (SALT, SORT, START, etc.) and spur a new arms race. This would undo 
decades of nuclear reduction policies and force the United States to respond in kind. 
Furthermore, such a breakdown in relations between Russia and the United States would 
also reignite Cold War mentalities on both sides, validate Russia‘s threat perception, and 
damage long-term relations. The United States needs the Russian Federation‘s active or 
passive support if it wants to succeed in its foreign policies and therefore would be hard 
pressed to enforce meaningful long-term punishments against it. 
Despite the dependence that Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world 
have on Russia, there would still be costly consequences for the use of nuclear weapons. 
First, it will greatly hurt Russia‘s status in global affairs as it will have violated the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) if employed against a non-nuclear state. Second, 
it would be damaging economically by driving away foreign investors and even short- 
term reductions in trade would damage the Russian economy. In particular, if foreign 






Figure 4. Image from ―European Dependence on Russian Natural Gas‖ (Stratfor: Global Intelligence, 




goods and resources, then the Russian economy and government revenues would be hurt 
as natural gas and oil exports constitute a large portion of these. In 2006, oil and gas 
sector‘s share of the federal budget was 49 percent and accounted for 63 percent of 
exports.
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 The resulting volatility in the energy market, although increasing the price of 
energy, would also make alternative energy more cost effective and could spur countries 
dependent on Russian gas and oil to seek renewable alternatives to protect themselves.  
A nuclear first use would also help rally numerous states together against Russia. 
Just as the Cold War fear of a Soviet takeover of Europe bound the Western powers 
together through common cause, so could a Russian nuclear use in combat. This would 
undo years worth of foreign policy that has worked to establish close bilateral (and 
favorable) relations with numerous European states in an attempt to chip away at the 
cohesion of NATO and the European Union (EU). Instead, such an act would strengthen 
NATO and the EU with a decidedly anti-Russian objective. Therefore, there would be 
both short- and long-term consequences on the Russian economy if it went through with a 
nuclear first-use against an adversary, regardless of how justified they may have felt into 
doing so.  
Finally, the potential for a renewed arms race with the West or the United States 
as a result of this action would be equally expensive for the Russian Federation. The 
decisions taken by other states in response to Russia‘s nuclear use would only exacerbate 
its already strong threat perception. Even Russia‘s partner, China, could potentially be 
forced to distance itself and re-evaluate its relationship with Russian Federation. This 
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could include undertaking defensive countermeasures, reduction of trade and investment, 
and the elevation of Russia as a threat to Chinese national security.  
The purpose here is not to argue that the Russian Federation would or will use 
nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear threat, but to point out that it is not beyond the 
realm of possibility and that Russia‘s unique position in the global environment provides 
it with a measure of protection from the consequences associated with their use. Their use 
alone is not farfetched when considering the number of threats Russia‘s leaders‘ perceive 
and the vague definition of what constitutes a threat to the survival of the Russian 
Federation. As recently as 2008, the Russian military exercise codenamed ―Stability 
2008,‖ a month-long exercise, consisted of a hypothetical local conflict pitting Russia 
against the West. The simulated conflict escalated into global war eventually included the 
use of nuclear weapons by both sides.
301
 Clearly the Russian military considers this 
scenario possible and intends to be prepared for its eventuality. When considering the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons, the current weaknesses of Russia‘s conventional 
forces and Russia‘s potential ability to weather the global consequences of employing 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
 The Russian Federation will become increasingly dependent on nuclear weapons 
for national security in the future. The evidence presented above highlights that this will 
be an inescapable fact for the Russian leadership for historic, geographic, demographic 
reasons; a threat perception and military doctrine that will necessitate nuclear weapons; 
and current conventional capabilities that fall short in relation to the benefits of the 
nuclear forces. Despite attempts by the Russian leadership to overcome their reliance on 
nuclear weapons, there is no indication in the near future that they will free themselves 
from this dependence. As pressures increase in areas such as demographics and improved 
conventional and missile defense capabilities by other states, the need to rely on nuclear 
weapons will only increase. 
 Russians have an ingrained and historic fear of invasion and outside threat that 
has been reinforced numerous times throughout history, most recently during the Cold 
War by the West‘s containment policy directed toward the Soviet Union. The 
vulnerability of the Russian state is exacerbated by its geographic position. Also, the 
political, economic, and military consequences of the Soviet Union‘s collapse, especially 
the territorial losses severely weakened the Russian state. Meanwhile, the negative 
population growth and social problems pose a major demographic challenge for the 
Russia Federation especially in respect to military conscription. The status of the current 
conventional military forces, both personnel and equipment, and the inability of the 
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Russian defense industry to ―catch up‖ and produce military technology of equivalent 
capability with the West further increases their reliance on nuclear weapons. Finally, the 
benefits of nuclear weapons, particularly their reliability and demonstrated destructive 
capability, make them the only part of the Russia‘s military forces that are assured to 
perform effectively if employed. 
 The Russian Federation spent most of the 1990s leaning on their strategic nuclear 
forces to make up for the deficiencies in their conventional forces. What was meant only 
be a ―stop-gap‖ measure has turned into a consistent policy despite persistent attempts at 
improvement in conventional forces since 2000. The August 2008 conflict with Georgia 
demonstrated that those improvements have had a limited impact. The conflict 
emphasized many of the failures and systemic problems within the Russian conventional 
forces. Had the conflict lasted longer and Georgian forces put-up more resistance then the 
Russian victory could have been much more costly.  
 Unless substantial and effective reform takes place within the ranks of Russia‘s 
conventional forces then these forces will continue to perform poorly and be unprepared 
to defend the Russian Federation in the event of a major, or even limited, conflict. The 
inability of the Russian defense industry to reform, rebuild, and recruit new talent will 
prevent it from producing the types of weapons and technology that Russia‘s military 
forces will require in the 21st Century. Without reform in the ranks, elimination of the 
destructive practice known as dedovshchina, increased training, and supply of new and 
advanced equipment, Russia‘s conventional forces will continue to deteriorate and fail in 
the mission to protect the Russian Federation. 
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Finally, Russia‘s leaders need to reevaluate their current threat perception and 
view of the threat environment facing their country. Russia‘s obsession with invasion and 
attack from outside and continued perception of NATO and the United States as threats to 
Russia‘s existence is a major obstacle that must be overcome. This faulty perception 
dominates Russian planning and outlook, and has prevented the Russian government 
from concentrating more on the problems that risk destroying the Russian Federation or 
leading to another break-up like in 1991. Domestic terrorism and insurgent groups, drug 
use, alcoholism, falling demographics, and social problems such as the spread of 
HIV/AIDS are much more current and pressing problems that threaten the future of the 
Russian Federation more than an attack or invasion by NATO.  
In fact, Russia‘s dependence on it nuclear forces is not necessarily a negative 
outcome. Russia‘s leaders could embrace their dependence on nuclear weapons for their 
deterrent capability and financial gain. By emphasizing nuclear forces in national defense 
instead of a large conventional force, the Russian government can direct its funding and 
energies toward overcoming the other social and economic problems faced by the 
Federation. Also, if conventional forces are no longer expected to fight a major conflict, 
then they can be downsized to allow for the professionalization and modernization of a 
smaller military force that is contract based, highly trained and properly equipped. 
Obviously there would be a certain level of sacrifice in terms of conventional flexibility 
and response; however, Russia‘s current attempt to modernize and maintain a million-
man army is not yielding it any benefits. The only major consequence of such a policy is 
that the likelihood of a nuclear first-use by the Russian Federation would increase. 
However, this is expected to happen anyway under current conditions and Russian policy, 
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and if surrounding states realize that the Russian Federation is so heavily reliant on 
nuclear weapons then they are less likely to engage in activity that would elicit a nuclear 
response in the first place. 
Based on current trends, the Russian Federation‘s dependence on nuclear 
weapons will continue to increase whether Russia‘s leaders realize it or want it to happen. 
This dependence may take a long time to manifest itself and even longer for the Russian 
Federation to acknowledge it, if ever. Russia has always perceived itself as a major 
military power but that power may soon be limited solely to its nuclear forces. The 
problems in Russia continue to spread and, and have an ever increasing impact on the 
state and its military position. Whether Russia‘s leaders like it or not, nuclear weapons 
will provide them the only means by which to ensure their national security in a world 
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